This paper explores the politics of eminent domain, using a specific historical episode: the enactment of the new California constitution in 1879. It presents evidence that the failure of a constitutional provision that would have codified eminent domain powers for water development resulted from a complex interchange of economic interests among farmers, miners, and urban residents. This evidence was manifested in delegate behavior on the floor of the constitutional convention in 1878, including various roll-call votes, which are subjected to an econometric analysis. The results have implications for the interpretation of legislative eminent domain decisions, and the degree to which economic development processes are shaped by the institutional environment in which they occur.

本文利用一个具体的历史事件来探讨征用权的政治：1879 年新加州宪法的颁布。它提供了证据，表明将水开发征用权编入法典的宪法条款的失败是由于复杂的互换造成的。农民、矿工和城市居民的经济利益。这一证据体现在 1878 年制宪会议上代表们的行为中，包括各种唱名投票，并对这些投票进行了计量经济学分析。研究结果对立法征用权决策的解释以及经济发展过程受其发生的制度环境影响的程度具有影响。