Subjectivists think that our well-being is grounded in our subjective attitudes. Many such views are vulnerable to variations on the ‘paradox of desire’, where theories cannot make determinate judgements about the well-being of agents who take a positive valuing attitude towards their life going badly. However, this paradox does not affect all subjectivist theories; theories grounded on agents’ prudential values can avoid it. This paper suggests a new paradox for subjectivist theories which has a wider scope, and includes such prudential judgement theories. I outline the new paradox and show how two plausible idealisztions (coherence and consideration) will not help. Subjectivists about well-being must either add an additional idealization that can solve the paradox of judgement or explain why such paradoxes do not constitute serious objections to a theory of well-being.

中文翻译：

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幸福主观主义的新悖论


主观主义者认为我们的幸福取决于我们的主观态度。许多这样的观点很容易受到“欲望悖论”的影响，在这种悖论中，理论无法对那些对自己的糟糕生活采取积极评价态度的人的福祉做出明确的判断。然而，这个悖论并不影响所有主观主义理论；基于代理人审慎价值观的理论可以避免这种情况。本文为主观主义理论提出了一个新的悖论，其范围更广，包括审慎判断理论。我概述了新的悖论，并展示了两种看似合理的理想主义（连贯性和考虑）如何无济于事。关于幸福感的主观主义者必须要么增加一个额外的理想化，以解决判断的悖论，要么解释为什么这些悖论并不构成对幸福感理论的严重反对。