A longstanding puzzle about moral responsibility for negligence arises from three plausible yet jointly inconsistent theses: (i) an agent can, in certain circumstances, be morally responsible for some outcome O, even if her behavior with respect to O is negligent (i.e., even if she never adverted to the possibility that the behavior might result in O), (ii) an agent can be morally responsible for O only if she has some control over O, (iii) if an agent acts negligently with respect to O, then she has no control over O. This paper is in two parts. First, I argue that reasons-responsiveness models of moral responsibility can be applied naturally to negligence scenarios; indeed, agents are intuitively responsible for the outcomes of their negligent behavior just when they meet the conditions for responsibility given by the best reason-responsiveness theories. Second, if the reasons-responsiveness conditions are applicable to negligence scenarios then one of two things follows: either agents can have direct control over outcomes they never adverted to, or reasons-responsiveness is not a condition of control but of something else connected to moral responsibility. Each possibility would be important in its own right—and each can solve the negligence puzzle.

中文翻译：

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原因——反应性、控制力和疏忽之谜

关于过失的道德责任的一个长期谜题源于三个似是而非但又相互矛盾的论点：（i）在某些情况下，代理人可以对某些结果 O 承担道德责任，即使她对 O 的行为是疏忽的（即，甚至如果她从未意识到该行为可能导致 O)，(ii) 只有当她对 O 有一定控制力时，代理人才可以对 O 承担道德责任，(iii) 如果代理人对 O 采取疏忽行为，则她无法控制 O。本文分为两部分。首先，我认为道德责任的原因响应模型可以自然地应用于过失场景；事实上，当行为人满足最佳理性反应理论给出的责任条件时，他们直觉上要对其过失行为的结果负责。其次，如果原因响应条件适用于过失场景，那么就会出现以下两件事之一：要么代理人可以直接控制他们从未注意到的结果，要么原因响应不是控制条件，而是与道德相关的其他条件责任。每种可能性本身都很重要，并且每种都可以解决疏忽难题。