Free will is often understood as the control an agent exercises over her actions that is required for the agent to be held morally responsible for her conduct. This necessary control has been classified in the literature as of two varieties, sourcehood and leeway control. According to accounts of sourcehood free will and moral responsibility, an agent must be a significant source of her actions for her to act freely. The action is ‘up to her’ or her own. She is the author of that action. According to leeway accounts of free will and responsibility, an agent must have the right kind of alternatives to her actual course of action in order for her to act freely. This is often times discussed as the ability to do otherwise or could have done otherwise constraint. This question of kind of control relevant for moral responsibility is related to, but distinct from, whether free will is compatible with determinism, the compatibility question. Both compatibilists and incompatibilists have defended the relevance of sourcehood and leeway for being a morally responsible agent. Notably, contemporary sourcehood compatibilists, for dialectical reasons, have left open whether leeway control may be incompatible with determinism.

My aim in this paper is to advocate for an enhanced sourcehood compatibilist view, one that takes leeway control to be required for significant sourcehood and so for significant moral responsibility. That is, I will argue for a Kane-style compatibilist view of moral responsibility. This view takes seriously that the exercise of free will is inextricably linked to self-expression and self-formation. To put it in terms of the garden of forking paths, our actual actions are the taken paths of self-expression, but the paths not walked signify our freedom of alternative expression, possibilities that ground our significant moral agency.

In section one and two, I will outline sourcehood views of moral responsibility, particularly those that hold free action to be linked to self-expression and ownership or authorship of actions. In section two, I will marshal support from my own work and others for the claim that being a source of one's action in the moral responsibility sense requires some kind of alternatives to actual action. Specifically, I will make the case that this kind of enhanced control grounds self-expression in a way that is crucial for being an apt candidate of the morally reactive attitudes. In section three, I will argue that this kind of leeway control need not—and cannot—be of the incompatibilist formulation.

自由意志通常被理解为代理人对其行为进行的控制，这是代理人对其行为承担道德责任所必需的。这种必要的控制在文献中被分为两种：来源控制和余地控制。根据来源自由意志和道德责任的说法，代理人必须是她行动的重要来源，她才能自由行动。行动“取决于她”或她自己。她是该行动的作者。根据自由意志和责任的余地解释，代理人必须对她的实际行动方针有正确的选择，以便她能够自由行动。这经常被讨论为做其他事情的能力或可以做其他约束。这种与道德责任相关的控制问题与自由意志是否与决定论相容（即兼容性问题）有关，但又有所不同。相容论者和不相容论者都捍卫了作为道德责任主体的来源和余地的相关性。值得注意的是，出于辩证的原因，当代的来源相容论者对于回旋余地控制是否与决定论不相容持开放态度。

我在本文中的目的是倡导一种增强的来源相容主义观点，这种观点认为重要的来源需要留有余地控制，因此重要的道德责任也需要留有余地。也就是说，我将主张凯恩式的相容主义道德责任观。这种观点严肃地认为，自由意志的行使与自我表达和自我形成有着千丝万缕的联系。用岔路花园来说，我们的实际行动是自我表达所采取的道路，但未走的道路则意味着我们的替代表达自由，以及为我们重要的道德机构奠定基础的可能性。

在第一节和第二节中，我将概述道德责任的来源观点，特别是那些认为自由行动与自我表达和行为的所有权或作者联系在一起的观点。在第二节中，我将汇集我自己的工作和其他人的支持，以支持以下主张：作为道德责任意义上的一个人的行为的根源，需要某种实际行动的替代方案。具体来说，我将证明这种增强的控制以一种对于成为道德反应态度的合适候选人至关重要的方式奠定了自我表达的基础。在第三节中，我将论证这种回旋余地控制不需要也不可能采用不相容主义的表述。