Litigants settle in the shadow of the law, but they behave in the shadow of the settlement outcome. Disparities in bargaining power drive a wedge between the shadow of the settlement and the shadow of the law. Broad literature has recognized various problems that stem from this discrepancy, from suboptimal deterrence to distributive concerns. We offer a new perspective to address these concerns—regulating the settlement process, through a judge-induced bargaining protocol. We develop this argument through a bargaining protocol that assigns a take-it-or-leave-it offer to one of the parties and discuss the policy goals that such protocol could advance.

中文翻译：

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谈判协议的承诺

诉讼当事人在法律的阴影下和解，但他们的行为却在和解结果的阴影下进行。讨价还价能力的差异在和解的阴影和法律的阴影之间造成了裂痕。广泛的文献已经认识到这种差异引起的各种问题，从次优威慑到分配问题。我们提供了一个新的视角来解决这些问题——通过法官诱导的讨价还价协议来规范和解过程。我们通过一项讨价还价协议来阐述这一论点，该协议向其中一方分配“要么接受要么放弃”的要约，并讨论该协议可以推进的政策目标。