It is tempting to think (though many deny) that epistemic agents exercise a distinctive kind of control over their belief-like attitudes. My aim here is to sketch a “bottom-up” model of epistemic agency, one that draws on an analogous model of practical agency, according to which an agent's conditional beliefs are reasons-responsive planning states that initiate and sustain mental behavior so as to render controlled.

中文翻译：

---

无自愿的认知控制

人们很容易认为（尽管许多人否认）认知主体对他们的信仰态度施加了一种独特的控制。我在这里的目的是勾画出一种“自下而上”的认知能动性模型，该模型借鉴了实践能动性的类似模型，根据该模型，主体的条件信念是原因响应的计划状态，它启动并维持心理行为，以便渲染控制。