The standard event-causal theory of action says that an intentional action is caused in the right way by the right mental states. This view requires reductionism about agency. The causal role of the agent must be nothing over and above the causal contribution of the relevant mental event-causal processes. But commonsense finds this reductive solution to the “agent-mind problem”, the problem of explaining the relationship between agents and the mind, incredible. Where did the agent go? This paper suggests that this challenge against event-causal reductionism is importantly related to debates about fundamentality. It also suggests that extant event-causal answers to the agent-mind problem, ones that suggest that part of an agent's mind can stand proxy for the agent herself, fail against the challenge. It sketches an alternative reductive view that appeals to entity grounding. This view resolves the commonsense challenge and promises to be theoretically fruitful with respect to other longstanding problems with the event-casual view. The paper concludes with a burden-shifting argument against emergentist agent-causal theories and non-reductive event-causal theories of agency.

中文翻译：

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机构：让我们关注基本面1

标准的事件因果行动理论认为，有意的行动是由正确的心理状态以正确的方式引起的。这种观点需要关于代理的还原论。主体的因果作用一定不能超出相关心理事件因果过程的因果贡献。但常识发现这种对“主体-心灵问题”（解释主体与心灵之间关系的问题）的简化解决方案是令人难以置信的。代理去哪儿了？本文表明，对事件因果还原论的挑战与关于基本性的争论密切相关。它还表明，对代理人思维问题的现有事件因果答案，即代理人思维的一部分可以代表代理人本身，未能应对这一挑战。它勾勒出另一种诉诸实体基础的还原性观点。这种观点解决了常识性的挑战，并有望在理论上解决事件-偶然观点的其他长期存在的问题。本文最后提出了反对涌现论主体因果理论和非还原性事件因果理论的论证。