Libertarianism about free will conjoins the thesis that free will requires indeterminism with the thesis that we have free will. Here the claim that we have experiential evidence for the libertarian position is assessed. It is argued that, on a straightforward reading, the claim is false, for our experiences as agents don't support the claim that free will requires indeterminism. However, our experiences as agents may still have a role to play in an overall case for libertarianism, insofar as they give us some (defeasible) reason to think that we have free will. This latter claim is defended against a pair of objections that have been leveled against it.

中文翻译：

---

自由主义和代理经验

关于自由意志的自由主义将自由意志需要非决定论的论点与我们拥有自由意志的论点结合起来。这里评估了我们拥有支持自由主义立场的经验证据的主张。有人认为，从简单的角度来看，这种说法是错误的，因为我们作为代理人的经验并不支持自由意志需要非决定论的说法。然而，我们作为代理人的经历可能仍然在自由主义的整体案例中发挥作用，因为它们给了我们一些（可废止的）理由来认为我们拥有自由意志。后一个主张受到了针对它的两个反对意见的辩护。