One way to defend the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) against Frankfurt-style cases is to challenge the claim that agents in these scenarios are genuinely morally responsible for what they do. Alternatively, one can grant that agents are morally responsible for what they do in these cases but resist the idea that they could not have done otherwise. This latter strategy is known as the flicker defense of PAP. In an argument he calls the W-Defense, David Widerker adopts the former approach. I argue that, while Widerker's argument does a poor job showing that these agents are not morally responsible for what they do, it does a very good job highlighting the alternative possibilities that remain open to agents in these cases and illustrating their moral significance (or robustness). In doing so, my aim is to co-opt Widerker's argument to bolster the most promising versions of the flicker defense.

中文翻译：

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闪烁W防御

针对法兰克福式案件捍卫替代可能性原则（PAP）的一种方法是挑战这样一种说法，即在这些情况下，代理人对他们的行为真正负有道德责任。另一种观点是，人们可以承认代理人对他们在这些情况下所做的事情负有道义上的责任，但拒绝接受他们不可能这样做的想法。后一种策略称为 PAP 闪烁防御。在大卫·维德克 (David Widerker) 称之为“W 辩护”的争论中，他采用了前一种方法。我认为，虽然维德克的论点并没有很好地表明这些代理人对他们所做的事情不承担道德责任，但它很好地强调了在这些情况下代理人仍然可以选择的替代可能性，并说明了它们的道德意义（或稳健性））。这样做的目的是采纳 Widerker 的论点来支持最有前途的闪烁防御版本。