Is moral responsibility essentially historical, or does an agent's moral responsibility for an action depend only on their psychological structure at that time? In previous work, I have argued that the two main (non-skeptical) views on moral responsibility and agents’ histories—historicism and standard structuralism—are vulnerable to objections that are avoided by a third option, namely history-sensitive structuralism. In this paper, I develop this view in greater detail and evaluate the view by comparing it with its three dialectical rivals: skepticism about moral responsibility, historicism, and standard structuralism. Each comparison includes discussion of new work on moral responsibility and agents’ histories, and along the way I offer new arguments for preferring history-sensitive structuralism, paying special attention to the view's explanatory power.

中文翻译：

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为什么历史对道德责任很重要：评估历史敏感的结构主义

道德责任本质上是历史性的，还是行为人对某一行为的道德责任仅取决于他们当时的心理结构？在之前的工作中，我认为关于道德责任和主体历史的两种主要（非怀疑论）观点——历史主义和标准结构主义——很容易受到第三种选择所避免的反对，即历史敏感的结构主义。在本文中，我更详细地阐述了这一观点，并通过将其与其三个辩证对手进行比较来评估该观点：道德责任怀疑论、历史主义和标准结构主义。每次比较都包括对关于道德责任和代理人历史的新著作的讨论，在此过程中，我提出了支持历史敏感的结构主义的新论据，特别关注该观点的解释力。