This article considers the Turing test as a problem of communication, particularly by asking how the language of artificial intelligence (AI) appears to human experience in comparison to the language of the Other. This question is approached through Levinas’ philosophy, by considering the possibility of AI as an absolute alterity, rather than reducing its alterity to the Same. This perspective diverges from traditional accounts of AI, which are more concerned with identifying structures of consciousness in the machine that are analogous to those evident in firsthand experience. This article asks how exactly AI appears to human consciousness, and whether this appearance precludes the appearance of AI as a thinking-being. In the final analysis, the author argues that AI diverges from Levinas’ understanding of alterity, which centers around the exteriority of the Other. The alterity of AI, in contrast, centers around anteriority, defined as the appearance of language's origin-in-itself.

中文翻译：

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图灵测试的现象学：列维纳斯的观点

本文将图灵测试视为一个沟通问题，特别是通过询问与他人的语言相比，人工智能 (AI) 的语言在人类经验中的表现如何。这个问题是通过列维纳斯的哲学来解决的，通过考虑人工智能作为绝对相异性的可能性，而不是将其相异性降低到相同。这种观点与人工智能的传统观点不同，后者更关注识别机器中与第一手经验中明显的意识结构类似的意识结构。本文询问人工智能在人类意识中到底是如何出现的，以及这种出现是否排除了人工智能作为一种思维存在的出现。归根结底，作者认为人工智能偏离了列维纳斯对相异性的理解，它以他者的外在性为中心。相比之下，人工智能的相异性以先验性为中心，被定义为语言本身起源的出现。