We study the role of a relatively new type of external firm monitor, an on-site government-appointed Corporate Monitor, and assess whether such appointments reduce firms' propensity to violate laws. Using a sample of deferred and nonprosecution agreements, we first document the determinants of Monitor appointment. We find firms that voluntarily disclose wrongdoing and have more independent directors are less likely to have Corporate Monitors, whereas those with more severe infractions, mandated board changes, and increased cooperation requirements are more likely to have Monitors. We find such appointments are associated with an 18%–25% reduction in violations while the Monitor is on site, however, the effect does not persist after the Monitorship ends. Using a semisupervised machine learning method to measure changes in firms' ethics and compliance norms, we find that the reduction in violations is associated with changes in ethics and compliance that also do not persist. Finally, we document that firms under Monitorship experience a persistent reduction in innovation, highlighting a previously unexplored cost of these interventions. Overall, our results suggest that, although Corporate Monitors on site are associated with fewer violations, firms revert to previous levels of violations following Monitors' departure.

中文翻译：

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不在现场，心不在焉？政府指定的企业监察员的作用

我们研究了一种相对新型的外部公司监察员（政府任命的现场企业监察员）的作用，并评估这种任命是否会降低公司违法的倾向。通过使用延期协议和不起诉协议样本，我们首先记录了监察员任命的决定因素。我们发现，自愿披露不当行为并拥有更多独立董事的公司不太可能设立企业监察员，而那些违规行为更严重、强制董事会变更和合作要求更高的公司则更有可能设立监察员。我们发现，当监察员在现场时，此类任命与违规行为减少 18%–25% 相关，但是，在监察期结束后，这种效果不会持续。使用半监督机器学习方法来衡量公司道德和合规规范的变化，我们发现违规行为的减少与道德和合规性的变化相关，但这种变化也不会持续存在。最后，我们记录了受到监控的公司的创新持续减少，突显了这些干预措施之前未曾探索过的成本。总体而言，我们的结果表明，尽管现场企业监察员的违规行为较少，但在监察员离开后，公司的违规行为又恢复到之前的水平。