We study the interaction between optimal financial reporting rules and managers' incentives to gather additional information about firm performance. Accounting-based covenants transfer control rights to lenders, allowing them to take corrective actions. After the accounting report is released, the manager can exert effort to uncover whether the report is a false alarm or unduly optimistic. The manager's incentive to gather information stems from optimal incentive contracts and private benefits of control that she loses when the project is liquidated. We derive conditions under which managerial information acquisition renders conservative reporting optimal for shareholders and show that these conditions relax when the manager derives greater private benefits from the project or the cost of information acquisition declines. Our model provides novel explanations for existing empirical findings and offers new predictions with respect to covenant waivers, debt contract renegotiations, and the frequency of corrective actions.

中文翻译：

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会计稳健性与管理信息获取

我们研究最优财务报告规则与管理者收集有关公司绩效的额外信息的激励之间的相互作用。基于会计的契约将控制权转移给贷方，使他们能够采取纠正措施。会计报告发布后，管理者可以努力查明该报告是否虚惊或过度乐观。经理收集信息的动机源于最优激励合同和项目清算时她失去的控制权私人利益。我们推导了管理信息获取使保守的报告对股东而言是最佳的条件，并表明当管理者从项目中获得更大的私人利益或信息获取成本下降时，这些条件就会放松。我们的模型为现有的实证研究结果提供了新颖的解释，并提供了有关契约豁免、债务合同重新谈判和纠正措施频率的新预测。