In a tax—public goods reciprocity framework between citizens and the state, managers view taxes as a payment to the government in exchange for public goods, and hence they adjust their willingness to pay taxes as public good quality changes. We show that corporate tax planning intensity increases with ground-level ozone pollution. Revisions in ozone pollution regulations cause counties that failed the revised and more stringent standards to reduce ozone pollution. Consequently, firms headquartered in these counties reduced corporate tax planning intensity relative to firms in other counties. The ozone-tax link varies in the predicted directions with public attention to pollution, potential welfare loss due to ozone, managers’ stakeholder orientation, taxpayers’ polluting status, political preferences, and civic norms. We also find consistent results for Superfund cleanups of hazardous waste sites. Our research sheds light on reciprocity as a potential mechanism influencing corporate tax compliance.

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企业税收合规中的互惠——来自臭氧污染的证据

在公民与国家之间的税收—公共产品互惠框架中，管理者将税收视为向政府支付的公共产品费用，因此他们会随着公共产品质量的变化而调整纳税意愿。我们表明，企业税收筹划强度随着地面臭氧污染的增加而增加。臭氧污染法规的修订导致未达到修订后的更严格标准的县减少臭氧污染。因此，总部位于这些县的公司相对于其他县的公司降低了企业税收筹划强度。臭氧税与公众对污染的关注、臭氧造成​​的潜在福利损失、管理者的利益相关者导向、纳税人的污染状况、政治偏好和公民规范的预测方向有所不同。我们还发现超级基金对危险废物场地的清理结果一致。我们的研究揭示了互惠作为影响公司税务合规性的潜在机制。