Prawitz conjectured that the proof-theoretically valid logic is intuitionistic logic. Recent work on proof-theoretic validity has disproven this. In fact, it has been shown that proof-theoretic validity is not even closed under substitution. In this paper, we make a minor modification to the definition of proof-theoretic validity found in Prawitz’s 1973 paper ‘Towards a foundation of a general proof theory’ and refined by Schroeder-Heister in ‘Validity concepts in proof-theoretic semantics’ (2006 ). We will call the new notion generalized proof-theoretic validity and show that the logic of generalized proof-theoretic validity is intuitionistic logic.

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遵循所有规则：广义证明理论有效性的直觉完整性

普拉维茨推测证明理论上有效的逻辑是直觉逻辑。最近关于证明理论有效性的工作已经证明了这一点。事实上，已经证明，证明理论的有效性甚至在替代下也不是封闭的。在本文中，我们对 Prawitz 1973 年论文“迈向一般证明理论的基础”中发现的证明理论有效性的定义进行了微小修改，并由 Schroeder-Heister 在“证明理论语义中的有效性概念”（2006 年）中进行了细化。 ）。我们将这个新概念称为广义证明理论有效性，并证明广义证明理论有效性的逻辑是直觉逻辑。