This paper offers a new insight on the Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT) in the theory of epistemic democracy. This theorem states that democratic decision-making leads us to correct outcomes under certain assumptions. One key assumption is the ‘independence condition’, which requires that voters form their beliefs independently when they vote. This paper examines the role of an opinion leader as an informational source, which potentially violates independence. We demonstrate that voters’ beliefs may be correlated in the presence of the leader, and that the CJT can fail if the leader’s opinions are reliable. This leads us to the following paradoxical observation: for epistemic democracy, good leaders may be bad, while bad leaders may be good.

中文翻译：

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优秀的领导者真的是优秀的吗？

本文对认知民主理论中的孔多塞陪审团定理（CJT）提供了新的见解。该定理指出，民主决策使我们在某些假设下得出正确的结果。一个关键假设是“独立条件”，它要求选民在投票时独立形成自己的信念。本文探讨了意见领袖作为信息来源的角色，这可能违反了独立性。我们证明，选民的信念可能与领导人在场的情况相关，并且如果领导人的意见可靠，CJT 可能会失败。这使我们得出以下自相矛盾的观察：对于认知民主来说，好的领导者可能是坏的，而坏的领导者可能是好的。