Complaints from institutional investors suggest that principles-based disclosure regimes that rely on financial materiality standards produce inadequate nonfinancial environmental and social (E&S) information. Using the staggered introduction of 40 country-level regulations that mandate disclosure, I document that reporting E&S information relates to increased investment from institutional owners and has material effects on firms’ investment and financing decisions. Firms mandated to disclose E&S information allocate more investment toward long-term, innovative projects and raise more equity capital. Evidence indicates that disclosure attracts long-term–oriented institutional clientele with E&S preferences, which then feeds back on firm decision making. Although the effects of nonfinancial disclosure are similar to those of improved financial disclosure, this clientele mechanism is unique. Taken together, these results suggest that jurisdictions that rely solely on financial materiality disclosure standards create nonfinancial information frictions with material effects on investors and firm decision making.

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强制性非财务披露对财务的重大影响

机构投资者的抱怨表明，依赖财务重要性标准的基于原则的披露制度产生的非财务环境和社会（E＆S）信息不足。通过交错引入 40 个国家级强制披露的法规，我记录了报告 E&S 信息与机构所有者增加投资有关，并对公司的投资和融资决策产生重大影响。被强制披露环境与社会信息的公司将更多投资分配给长期创新项目并筹集更多股本。有证据表明，信息披露吸引了具有 E&S 偏好的长期导向的机构客户，然后反馈给公司决策。尽管非财务披露的效果与改进的财务披露的效果相似，但这种客户机制是独特的。总而言之，这些结果表明，仅依赖财务重要性披露标准的司法管辖区会造成非财务信息摩擦，对投资者和公司决策产生重大影响。