Much of policy-making involves prioritization—deciding not only what to do, but also when—and uncertainty—not knowing exactly how the choices made will affect actual policy outcomes. I present a theory of dynamic prioritization within a hierarchical organization. The model illustrates how notions such as an agency’s performance, mission, and critical tasks are linked with details such as institutional structure and the preferences of both front-line bureaucrats and their overseers. The theory highlights some reasons why even sincere, representative policy-making decisions might appear irrational, inconsistent, or “captured” to outside observers. This is in contrast to classical “spatial models” of policy that abstract from the more quotidian details of how policy is actually made as opposed to simply being “chosen.” The theory also generates traditional comparative static-style predictions about the features of the policy-making tasks, the preferences of bureaucrats and political overseers, and agency structure that affect the substance and quality of policy-making. Finally, the theory offers a general explanation for why real-world agencies employ widely varying processes to organize and implement policy-making: optimal policy-making is—in a precise sense—“sufficiently complicated” to render a succinct and robust summary of optimal management impossible.

中文翻译：

---

制定政策：组织实施和管理理论

许多政策制定都涉及优先级——不仅决定做什么，还决定何时做——以及不确定性——不知道所做的选择将如何影响实际的政策结果。我提出了一种分层组织内的动态优先级理论。该模型说明了机构的绩效、使命和关键任务等概念如何与机构结构以及一线官僚及其监督者的偏好等细节联系起来。该理论强调了为什么即使是真诚的、有代表性的决策也可能在外部观察者看来不合理、不一致或“被捕获”的一些原因。这与经典的政策“空间模型”形成鲜明对比，后者从政策实际制定方式的日常细节中抽象出来，而不是简单地“选择”。该理论还对政策制定任务的特征、官僚和政治监督者的偏好以及影响政策制定的实质和质量的机构结构产生传统的比较静态预测。最后，该理论对为什么现实世界的机构采用广泛不同的流程来组织和实施政策制定提供了一般性解释：从精确的意义上讲，最优政策制定“足够复杂”，以至于不可能对最优管理进行简洁而有力的总结。