Creating intergovernmental environmental clubs is a prominent policy proposal for addressing global environmental problems. According to their proponents, environmental clubs provide an incentive to join them and accept their environmental obligations by generating exclusive “club goods” for their members. Yet, the existing literature considers environmental clubs as a theoretical idea that still has to be put into practice. This article asks whether, in fact, the numerous international environmental agreements (IEAs) containing trade-related provisions provide club goods to their parties. It does so by investigating the effects of these provisions on trade flows among parties compared to flows with non-parties. We introduce an original dataset on 48 types of trade provisions in 2,097 IEAs that we make available with the publication of this article. Based on this new data and a panel of worldwide bilateral trade flows, we find evidence that existing IEAs and their trade-liberalizing content are associated with increased trade among their parties relative to trade with non-parties. We conclude from this finding that systems of IEAs provide club goods to their parties. Uncovering the existence of environmental clubs has significant methodological and policy implications. It is an important first step for future research on the actual effectiveness of clubs in attracting participation and raising environmental standards.

创建政府间环境俱乐部是解决全球环境问题的一项重要政策建议。据其支持者称，环保俱乐部通过为其会员提供独家“俱乐部商品”来激励他们加入并接受其环保义务。然而，现有文献认为环保俱乐部只是一个理论想法，仍需付诸实践。本文询问，事实上，众多包含贸易相关条款的国际环境协定（IEA）是否向其缔约方提供了俱乐部商品。它通过调查这些规定对缔约方之间贸易流量与非缔约方贸易流量的影响来实现这一目标。我们介绍了 2,097 个 IEA 中 48 种贸易条款的原始数据集，我们在本文发布时提供了该数据集。根据这些新数据和一组全球双边贸易流量，我们发现证据表明，现有国际能源机构及其贸易自由化内容与其缔约方之间的贸易相对于非缔约方的贸易增加有关。我们从这一发现中得出结论，IEAs 系统向其政党提供俱乐部商品。揭示环境俱乐部的存在具有重大的方法论和政策意义。这是未来研究俱乐部在吸引参与和提高环境标准方面的实际效果的重要第一步。