I will argue that the ontological doctrine of physicalism inevitably entails the denial that there is anything conceptual in logic and mathematics. The elements of a formal system, even if they are tagged by suggestive names, are merely meaningless parts of a physically existing machinery, which have nothing to do with concepts, because they have nothing to do with the actual things. The only situation in which they can become meaning-carriers is when they are involved in a physical theory. But in this role they refer to elements of the physical reality, i.e. they represent a physical concept. “Mathematical concepts” are just idols, that philosophy can completely deny and physics can completely ignore.

我认为，物理主义的本体论学说不可避免地会否认逻辑和数学中存在任何概念性的东西。形式系统的各个要素，即使标有暗示性的名称，也只是物理存在的机器中无意义的部分，与概念无关，因为它们与实际事物无关。他们能够成为意义载体的唯一情况是当他们涉及物理理论时。但在这个角色中，它们指的是物理现实的元素，即它们代表了一个物理概念。 “数学概念”只是哲学可以完全否认、物理学可以完全忽视的偶像。