Is Gilles Deleuze’s concept of virtuality sufficiently close to the concept of virtuality used in informatics and the philosophy of information for computer-created objects and virtual reality to justify the latter’s explanation by means of the former? This question is the main objective of the present paper. We aim to show that, contrary to its most widespread interpretations, the Deleuzian conception of virtuality is epistemological and not ontological, and that this invalidates the belief that Deleuze’s virtuality and that of computer science are sufficiently close to justify the transposition of one to the other.

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德勒兹的虚拟性与虚拟计算机对象的概念

吉尔·德勒兹的虚拟性概念是否足够接近信息学中使用的虚拟性概念以及计算机创建的对象和虚拟现实的信息哲学，以证明后者通过前者的解释是正确的？这个问题是本文的主要目的。我们的目的是表明，与其最广泛的解释相反，德勒兹的虚拟性概念是认识论的，而不是本体论的，并且这使德勒兹的虚拟性和计算机科学的虚拟性足够接近以证明其中之一的转换是合理的信念无效。 。