Abstract

Several defamation cases stemming from apparently irrational statements are testing the boundaries and standards of defamation law. The constitutional standard for defamation of public figures, actual malice, is based on the speaker’s knowledge that a statement is false or their reckless disregard for whether it is true. An irrational speaker who believes their statement is true confounds this test. This article delineates aspects of defamation law that are challenged by an irrational speaker and concludes with a recommendation to include a stronger “objective” element in the application of the actual malice standard to such cases.

中文翻译：

---

不合理的标准？：将实际恶意应用于非理性说话者的困境

摘要

多起因明显不合理言论而引发的诽谤案件正在考验诽谤法的界限和标准。诽谤公众人物的宪法标准是真正的恶意，其依据是说话者知道某项陈述是虚假的，或者他们鲁莽地漠视该陈述是否属实。一个非理性的演讲者如果相信自己的陈述是正确的，就会混淆这个测试。本文概述了诽谤法受到非理性演讲者质疑的方面，并建议在对此类案件适用实际恶意标准时纳入更强的“客观”要素。