We explore whether municipalities with public sector unions exploit aspects of governmental (or “fund”) accounting to obscure the availability of discretionary resources in fund balance accounts, relative to municipalities without public sector unions. We first investigate whether governments with unions report higher proportions of discretionary resources outside of the general fund, a primary measure of financial health, and instead within less prominent fund types. Second, we explore whether governments with unions report lower ratios within accessible general fund balance account categories – that is, report lower proportions of unreserved fund balance. Primary findings are consistent with both hypotheses. Although somewhat mixed, cross-sectional analyses reveal that effects are magnified when unions have more bargaining power, as proxied by the ability to strike or the absence of state right-to-work laws. Further analysis corroborates cross-sectional findings by examining difference-in-differences specifications surrounding the quasi-exogenous shock of Wisconsin's 2011 weakening of state public sector union laws and Ohio's time-varying union contract negotiations. Overall, the evidence suggests that governments with unions shelter resources to avoid the appearance of large discretionary amounts available.

中文翻译：

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政府是否向工会隐瞒资源？公共部门工会对报告的全权委托基金余额比率的影响

我们探讨了相对于没有公共部门工会的城市，拥有公共部门工会的城市是否利用政府（或“基金”）会计的某些方面来掩盖基金余额账户中可自由支配资源的可用性。我们首先调查有工会的政府是否在普通基金（衡量财务健康状况的主要指标）之外报告了较高比例的可自由支配资源，而在不太突出的基金类型中。其次，我们探讨有工会的政府是否报告了可访问的普通基金余额账户类别中较低的比率，即报告了较低比例的未保留基金余额。主要发现与这两个假设一致。尽管有些复杂，但横断面分析表明，当工会拥有更大的议价能力时，影响就会放大，比如罢工能力或缺乏国家工作权法。进一步的分析通过检查围绕威斯康星州 2011 年弱化州公共部门工会法和俄亥俄州随时间变化的工会合同谈判的准外生冲击的双重差异规范，证实了横截面调查结果。总体而言，证据表明，拥有工会的政府会庇护资源，以避免出现大量可自由支配的资金。