This article analyzes the “politics of experts”—or the struggle between scientific advisers to gain visibility and influence—in the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic in Italy and the UK. Modifying classic studies of policy communities of interest groups and civil servants, we classify relevant policy experts in the two countries into the following categories: “core insiders,” “specialist insiders,” “peripheral insiders,” and “outsiders.” Within these categories, we distinguish between “high-profile” and “low-profile” experts, depending on media exposure. The comparison between the UK and Italian cases helps to identify how actors interpret and follow formal and informal “rules of the game.” We identify a contest between experts to influence policy with reference to two competing “rules of the game.” The first set of rules comes from government, while the second comes from science advice principles. These rules collide, such as when governments require secrecy and nonconfrontation and scientists expect transparency and independent criticism. Therefore, experts face dilemmas regarding which rules to favor: some accept the limits to their behavior to ensure insider access; others are free to criticize the policies that they struggle to influence.

中文翻译：

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COVID-19 专家的政治：比较意大利和英国的赢家和输家

本文分析了意大利和英国 COVID-19 大流行的最初几个月中的“专家政治”，即科学顾问之间为获得知名度和影响力而进行的斗争。我们修改利益集团和公务​​员政策共同体的经典研究，将两国相关政策专家分为以下几类：“核心内部人士”、“专业内部人士”、“外围内部人士”和“外部人士”。在这些类别中，我们根据媒体曝光度区分“高调”和“低调”专家。英国和意大利案例之间的比较有助于确定参与者如何解释和遵循正式和非正式的“游戏规则”。我们参考两个相互竞争的“游戏规则”来确定专家之间影响政策的竞争。第一组规则来自政府，第二个来自科学建议原则。这些规则相互冲突，例如当政府要求保密和非对抗，而科学家则期望透明度和独立批评时。因此，专家们面临着选择哪些规则的困境：有些人接受对其行为的限制，以确保内部人员的参与；有些人则接受限制。其他人可以自由地批评他们努力影响的政策。