It has been argued that in the context of Bohm’s approach to quantum mechanics, the postulation of a three-dimensional ontology (as opposed to a high-dimensional one) is presumed to be the only interpretation that may reliably support object-oriented realism by virtue of the fact that this ontology is approximately preserved through scientific change, at least in the classical–quantum transition. Based on an interpretative analysis of the Bohmian formulation, I shall critically evaluate the tenability of this argument. In so doing, I shall argue that this formulation admits the postulation of an alternative ontology that is properly defined in a high-dimensional space, and is approximately preserved among this transition. As a result, both the three-dimensional and the high-dimensional worldviews shall form the basis of an equally reliable endorsement of object-oriented realism in the context of the Bohmian framework. I shall conclude that this argument becomes a problem of metaphysical underdetermination between a three and a high-dimensional Bohmian interpretation.

有人认为，在玻姆量子力学方法的背景下，三维本体论（而不是高维本体论）的假设被认为是唯一可以可靠地支持面向对象实在论的解释。事实上，这种本体论大约是通过科学变革得以保留的，至少在经典-量子转变中是这样。基于对波姆公式的解释分析，我将批判性地评估这一论点的可行性。在此过程中，我将论证这一表述承认了在高维空间中正确定义的替代本体论的假设，并且在这种转变中近似保留。因此，三维世界观和高维世界观都将在波姆框架的背景下构成对面向对象现实主义同样可靠的认可的基础。我的结论是，这个论证变成了三维和高维波姆解释之间形而上学不确定性的问题。