Those who love philosophy books that present new, exciting, and complex theories have been given a gift in Barbara Herman’s The Moral Habitat. In my view, it is also a gift to Kant, since it develops a deeply Kantian account of deliberation as part of showing how perfect and imperfect duties can be seen as working together in a dynamic moral (eco)system of duties of right and of virtue. In the process of doing this, Herman develops a new, intriguing account of imperfect duties and replaces many of Kant’s bad examples with good ones, providing an ideal model for how to argue by example, whether one is Kantian or not. Moreover, by her many intriguing and rich examples, Herman makes many of Kant’s ideas, as well as her revisionary Kantian ideas, available as resources in our shared philosophical practice. Of course, Kantians and others will disagree with some of her arguments and proposals, but many of these discussions yet to come will themselves become important additions to the existing scholarship. Fortunately, too, for a book that presents a new and complex Kantian theory, it does not get bogged down in specific scholarly disputes on particular topics; instead, it stays focused on developing and communicating the big moves, the big picture. Finally, as with all Herman’s brilliant writings, The Moral Habitat is beautifully written—with care, wit, and wisdom. It is, in other words, among the best of gifts: a reliable friend to think with about some very complex and difficult topics—philosophical and human—from now on.The moral habitat is defined as “a made environment, created by and for free and equal persons living together,” and Herman consequently puts “the deliberating and morally active person at the center of a generative moral enterprise” (ix). Herman’s book is furthermore divided into three parts: part 1 “Three Imperfect Duties,” part 2 “Kantian Resources,” and part 3 “Living in the Moral Habitat.” Part 1 serves to rid readers of some ingrained expectations they are likely to have of Kantian discussions of imperfect duty, such as the expectation that this will mostly be a discussion of beneficence or that it will assume a specific, historically prominent interpretation of motive or incentive. In these ways, Herman helps us to open our philosophical minds and stimulates our philosophical curiosity and imagination. More specifically, after the first chapter, focused on “Framing the Question (What We Can Learn From Imperfect Duties),” Herman provides chapter-length discussions of gratitude, giving, and due care (chaps. 2, 3, and 4, resp.). Her main strategy throughout these chapters is to develop each idea from the bottom up, working from many rich and intriguing examples to a summary section in each chapter—called “middle work”—where she draws our (philosophically trained minds’) attention to her main findings. For example, the main focus of chapter 3 is the puzzle of why giving too much—such as paying too much when repaying a loan or giving too much as a gift—causes damage. In the “middle work” section following these examples, Herman then draws out some metanormative claims about how permissibility and wrongness relate to one another, with a special focus on her claim throughout this chapter that there is a “possible consistency of not impermissible and morally wrong” (43).Herman’s strategy in this first part is effective and productive. It shows us that figuring out what to do in any situation (good deliberation) requires us to pay attention to its complexity—an interpretation of Kant’s statement that wisdom requires “judgement sharpened by experience” (Kant 1996)—and to how many rights, duties, and obligations interweave in specific situations. The examples also help everyone to be ready for the more philosophically sophisticated discussions in the “middle work” sections and, of course, for the rest of the book. Herman’s strategy here also helps rid us of the bad habit of looking for simple solutions to complex questions—whether our preferred simplifying method is to focus on one, allegedly core, example (of Kant’s) or one principle, or one interpretation thereof (such as the so-called categorical imperative procedure). Living life well, on our own and together with others, is much more difficult than this at any given moment and through time (as the circumstances of our lives evolve and change). In these ways—and throughout the book—Herman shows us how to deliberate within the Kantian framework; Aristotle is no longer the only (classical) alternative in town on the topic of good deliberation.Part 2 zooms in on Kantian practical philosophical resources, especially as they are found in, and can be further developed from, the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals and The Metaphysics of Morals. Herman’s overall aim here is to “introduce and argue for a revisionary interpretation of Kant’s ethics (broadly construed)… [as] guided by two lodestars: that the resulting reading be convincingly Kant’s ethics, in both letter and spirit, and that the revision justify itself by giving us a better theory, in its own terms and in ours” (73). More specifically, chapter 6 (“The Kantian System of Duties”) presents Herman’s interpretation of many basic interpretive and philosophical ideas regarding right, including how it is prior to virtue in important regards. For example, until something distinct from us (such as property) really is ours, it is not ours to give (e.g., as a gift). In chapter 7 (“Kantian Imperfect Duties”), she presents her innovative account of imperfect duties. Here a central aim is to explain why we must not conflate “ends and duties” so that we can see how one “single obligatory end gives rise to a number of duties” (123). In addition, a great amount of time is obviously still devoted to the “posterchild” of imperfect duty, beneficence. However, Herman develops the conventional approach here by, among other things, convincingly proposing that we need to clearly distinguish between “relational beneficence” and beneficence involving strangers (including “humanitarian beneficence”). For example, internal to friendships, gifts and help come with the challenge of making sure that they do not undermine our equality. Wisdom in these regards requires us to understand both a lot about ourselves and our friends as well as how the gift fits into our historical and ongoing, dynamic project of living life together as equals. Gifts can bring us closer together or push us apart, and Herman interestingly suggests that gratitude functions to maintain a good relationship (of equality) when needed assistance is offered and accepted. Finally, in chapter 8 (“Tracking Value and Extending Duties”), Herman presents her take on certain casuistic puzzles as well as imperfect judicial duties. Here she engages, for instance, some of the problems related to lying and self-defense, arguing, first (as she has before), for the exception to the rule when it comes to lying (when doing so does not undermine the end sustained by the general prohibition on lying) and, second (for the first time), that in a fundamental sense, private individuals do not have a right to self-defense (as only the public authority can use coercion rightfully).In part 3, Herman explores some topics central to living in the moral habitat understood as a “dynamic system” (chap. 9) before zooming in on defending “A Right to Housing” (chap. 10) domestically and internationally (refugees). In short, the chapter on housing illustrates how to realize the general Kantian idea of rightful external freedom with regard to this particular issue in our current moral habitats. She then turns to more general ideas or challenges involved in being an agent of ongoing and always incomplete moral change in chapter 11 (“Incompleteness and Moral Change”). Her most general claim here is that “we should accept that there is in principle nothing that counts as a complete or ideal system of duties for human beings. That there is no theoretical point of view from which all that ought to be done is fully determinate or determinable” (213). Among other things, here she reflects on the fact that although we have never had good reasons to restrict moral habitat to certain subsections of human animals, we also have good reasons for why it should not be limited to only human animals and thus exclude other animals. Indeed, she proposes, it is quite possible that in the future we may have reasons also to include robots (artificial intelligence) in various ways. The moral habitat is constantly evolving, and the aim is to become better moral agents of change so that our participation in it helps to transform and improve it. Which is not to say that all the bads in the past or present were or are “just so” (216).In her conclusion “Method and Limits,” Herman underscores that the book as a whole emphasizes that “the notion of innate right is the appropriate starting point for a system of duties, rights, and obligations suited to the condition of human beings” (228). She also stresses that her central aim has been to show how motive must be thought of as “the internal analogue of procedural value—arriving at the right result the right way.” As such, this “notion of motive … is a better fit with psychological theories of human development that see the dynamic changes in the value-objects of affects as essential to the emergence of a healthy human self” (230). Finally, she concludes that another overarching aim has been to show how “imperfect duties are central, substantial parts of the moral terrain, sometimes demanding and often open-ended…. They often provide space for us to bring our critical and imaginative faculties to bear on a developing and dynamic moral system that can have both a creative and a regulatory role in our lives” (230).In the English-speaking world, the topic of imperfect duties has been a core concern for many Kantians in the last few decades, from Onora O’Neill and Thomas E. Hill Jr. to Sarah Holtman and Carol Hay. Similarly, the last couple of decades have seen an explosion in scholarship on Kant’s Doctrine of Right, with libertarian interpretive lines initiated by Sharon Byrd and Joachim Hruscka as well as liberal republican interpretive lines initiated by Thomas Pogge, Ernest Weinrib, and Arthur Ripstein dominating the English-language scholarship. The Moral Habitat is the first of its kind to present an account of imperfect duties that is deeply complementary to works in the liberal republican interpretive tradition, but there is much for all Kantians and non-Kantians to generatively engage in terms of scholarship and philosophical proposals. The Moral Habitat is, as I said at the beginning, a gift to our shared philosophical enterprise; enjoy!

中文翻译：

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道德栖息地

芭芭拉·赫尔曼 (Barbara Herman) 的《道德栖息地》(The Moral Habitat) 为那些喜爱介绍新颖、令人兴奋和复杂理论的哲学书籍的人提供了一份礼物。在我看来，这也是给康德的礼物，因为它发展了一种深刻的康德式的慎思解释，作为展示完美和不完美的义务如何被视为在权利和义务的动态道德（生态）系统中协同工作的一部分。美德。在这样做的过程中，赫尔曼发展了一种新的、有趣的关于不完全义务的解释，并用好的例子取代了康德的许多坏例子，为如何通过例子进行辩论提供了一个理想的模型，无论一个人是不是康德。此外，赫尔曼通过她的许多有趣和丰富的例子，使康德的许多思想以及她修正的康德思想成为我们共同的哲学实践中的资源。当然，康德主义者和其他人会不同意她的一些论点和建议，但许多这些尚未到来的讨论本身将成为现有学术的重要补充。同样幸运的是，对于一本介绍新的、复杂的康德理论的书来说，它不会陷入特定主题的特定学术争论中；相反，它始终专注于制定和传达大动作和大局。最后，与赫尔曼的所有杰出作品一样，《道德栖息地》写得非常优美——用心、机智和智慧。换句话说，它是最好的礼物之一：一个可靠的朋友，可以从现在开始思考一些非常复杂和困难的话题——哲学和人类。道德栖息地被定义为“一个人造环境，由自由平等的人生活在一起，” 赫尔曼因此将“深思熟虑和道德活跃的人置于生成性道德企业的中心”（ix）。赫尔曼的书进一步分为三个部分：第 1 部分“三种不完美的职责”、第 2 部分“康德资源”和第 3 部分“生活在道德栖息地”。第 1 部分旨在使读者摆脱他们可能对康德式关于不完全责任的讨论抱有的一些根深蒂固的期望，例如期望这将主要是对善行的讨论，或者它将假定对动机或激励的特定的、历史上突出的解释. 通过这些方式，赫尔曼帮助我们打开哲学思维，激发我们的哲学好奇心和想象力。更具体地说，在第一章之后，重点是“提出问题（我们可以从不完美的职责中学到什么）”，” Herman 对感恩、给予和应有的关怀进行了整章的讨论（分别为第 2、3 和 4 章）。她在这些章节中的主要策略是自下而上地发展每个想法，从许多丰富有趣的例子到每一章的总结部分——称为“中间工作”——在那里她吸引我们（受过哲学训练的头脑）注意她主要发现。例如，第 3 章的主要焦点是为什么给予过多（例如在偿还贷款时支付过多或作为礼物给予过多）会造成损害的困惑。在这些例子之后的“中间工作”部分，赫尔曼随后提出了一些关于可允许性和错误性如何相互关联的元规范性主张，并特别关注她在本章中的主张，即存在“并非不允许和道德上的可能一致性”错”（43）。Herman 在第一部分中的策略是有效且富有成效的。它向我们表明，弄清楚在任何情况下该做什么（深思熟虑）需要我们注意它的复杂性——对康德关于智慧需要“经验丰富的判断力”（Kant 1996）的说法的解释——以及有多少权利，职责和义务在特定情况下交织在一起。这些示例还帮助每个人为“中间工作”部分中更哲学复杂的讨论做好准备，当然也为本书的其余部分做好准备。赫尔曼在这里的策略也帮助我们摆脱了为复杂问题寻找简单解决方案的坏习惯——无论我们首选的简化方法是关注一个据称核心的（康德的）例子还是一个原则，或其一种解释（例如所谓的绝对命令程序）。在任何特定时刻和时间（随着我们生活环境的演变和变化），独自或与他人一起过好生活比这要困难得多。通过这些方式——贯穿全书——赫尔曼向我们展示了如何在康德框架内进行深思熟虑；亚里士多德不再是城里关于善意思考主题的唯一（经典）替代方案。第 2 部分重点介绍了康德的实用哲学资源，尤其是在道德形而上学基础中发现的，并且可以从中进一步发展的和道德形而上学。赫尔曼在这里的总体目标是“介绍并争论对康德伦理学（广义解释）的修正解释……[在] 两个北极星的指导下：由此产生的阅读在文字和精神上都是令人信服的康德伦理学，并且修订通过以其自己的术语和我们的术语为我们提供了更好的理论来证明自己是正确的”（73）。更具体地说，第 6 章（“康德义务体系”）介绍了赫尔曼对许多关于权利的基本解释和哲学思想的解释，包括权利如何在重要方面先于美德。例如，在与我们截然不同的东西（例如财产）真正属于我们之前，它不是我们可以给予的（例如，作为礼物）。在第 7 章（“康德不完美职责”）中，她提出了她对不完美职责的创新解释。这里的一个中心目标是解释为什么我们不能将“目的和义务”混为一谈，以便我们可以看到一个“单一的强制性目的如何产生许多义务”（123）。此外，大量的时间显然仍然花在了不完美的责任、善行的“后代”上。然而，赫尔曼在这里发展了传统方法，除其他外，令人信服地提出我们需要清楚地区分“关系慈善”和涉及陌生人的慈善（包括“人道主义慈善”）。例如，友谊、礼物和帮助的内在挑战是确保它们不会破坏我们的平等。这些方面的智慧要求我们了解很多关于我们自己和我们朋友的事情，以及这份礼物如何融入我们历史悠久、持续不断、充满活力的平等生活项目。礼物可以拉近我们的距离，也可以拉近我们的距离，赫尔曼有趣地指出，当提供和接受需要的帮助时，感恩的作用是维持良好的（平等的）关系。最后，在第 8 章（“追踪价值和延伸职责”）中，赫尔曼提出了她对某些谜题以及不完善的司法职责的看法。例如，她在这里涉及一些与说谎和自卫有关的问题，首先（正如她之前所做的那样）争论说谎时的规则例外（当这样做不会破坏持续的目的时普遍禁止说谎），其次（第一次），从根本上讲，私人没有自卫权（因为只有公共当局才能正当使用强制手段）。在第 3 部分中，赫尔曼探讨了生活在被理解为“动态系统”的道德栖息地（第 9 章）中的一些核心主题，然后着重讨论在国内和国际（难民）中捍卫“住房权”（第 10 章）。简而言之，关于住房的章节说明了如何在我们当前的道德栖息地中针对这一特定问题实现康德的正当外部自由的一般思想。然后，她在第 11 章（“不完整性和道德变化”）中转向更一般的想法或挑战，这些想法或挑战涉及成为持续且始终不完整的道德变革的代理人。她在这里最普遍的主张是“我们应该接受原则上没有任何东西可以算作人类的完整或理想的责任体系。没有任何理论观点可以证明所有应该做的事情都是完全确定的或可确定的”（213）。除其他外，她在这里反思了这样一个事实：虽然我们从来没有充分的理由将道德栖息地限制在人类动物的某些部分，但我们也有充分的理由说明为什么它不应该仅限于人类动物，从而排除其他动物. 事实上，她提出，很有可能在未来我们也有理由以各种方式包括机器人（人工智能）。道德栖息地在不断发展，目的是成为更好的道德变革推动者，以便我们参与其中有助于改造和改进它。这并不是说过去或现在的所有坏事都“只是这样”（216）。在她的结论“方法和限制，”赫尔曼强调，整本书都强调“先天权利的概念是适合人类状况的义务、权利和义务体系的适当起点”（228）。她还强调，她的中心目标是表明动机必须如何被视为“程序价值的内部类比——以正确的方式达到正确的结果”。因此，这种“动机的概念……更符合人类发展的心理学理论，这些理论认为情感价值对象的动态变化对于健康的人类自我的出现至关重要”（230）。最后，她得出结论，另一个总体目标是表明“不完美的职责是如何成为道德领域的核心、重要部分，有时要求很高，而且往往是开放式的……。它们经常为我们提供空间，让我们发挥批判性和想象力，来影响一个发展中的、充满活力的道德体系，这个道德体系可以在我们的生活中发挥创造性和调节作用”（230）。在英语世界，这个话题在过去的几十年里，不完美的义务一直是许多康德主义者关注的核心问题，从奥诺拉·奥尼尔和小托马斯·E·希尔到莎拉·霍尔特曼和卡罗尔·海伊。同样，在过去的几十年里，关于康德法权主义的学术研究呈爆炸式增长，由 Sharon Byrd 和 Joachim Hruscka 发起的自由意志主义解释路线以及由 Thomas Pogge、Ernest Weinrib 和 Arthur Ripstein 发起的自由共和主义解释路线主导了学术界。英语奖学金。道德栖息地是同类中第一个提出不完美义务的帐户，它与自由共和主义解释传统中的作品有着深刻的互补性，但所有康德主义者和非康德主义者都可以在学术和哲学建议方面积极参与. 道德栖息地，正如我在开头所说的，是对我们共同的哲学事业的礼物；享受！