In 2008, the Illinois State Legislature found that “innocent persons who have been wrongly convicted of crimes in Illinois and subsequently imprisoned have been frustrated in seeking legal redress due to a variety of substantive and technical obstacles in the law[.]” To correct this injustice, the General Assembly created a petition for a Certificate of Innocence (“COI”), which provides wrongfully convicted individuals the opportunity to obtain financial relief for time spent incarcerated. Petitioners must show that they “did not by [their] own conduct voluntarily cause or bring about [their] conviction.” Notably, the legislature did not supply a definition for “voluntary,” leaving courts free to impart their own. Despite the legislature’s recognition that “substantive and technical obstacles” prevent wrongly convicted individuals from relief, Illinois courts have imposed such obstacles through the term “voluntary.” In some instances, courts ignore this critical term by entirely omitting it from statutory analysis; in others, courts use “voluntary” to deny COIs. In the judiciary’s view, an individual “voluntarily cause[s] or bring[s] about” their conviction when they confess to a crime or accept a plea deal, regardless of the circumstances. This interpretation ignores the innocence of a person whose confession was coerced or accepted a plea deal under circumstances disguised as a rational choice. Although granting a COI is “generally within the sound discretion of a court,” the Illinois judiciary has improperly imposed a condition absent from the text that, carried to its logical conclusion, would deny COIs to innocent people. This Comment explores the purpose of Section 2-702, contemplates “voluntary” conduct, and illuminates the implications of judicial frustration. The case of Wayne Washington exemplifies the judiciary’s abuse of discretion and its imposition of substantive and technical obstacles that the Illinois legislature sought to overcome by enacting Section 2-702. Finally, this Comment argues that COIs are the only adequate remedy for wrongfully convicted individuals and proposes legislative and judicial solutions.

2008 年，伊利诺伊州立法机关发现，“由于法律中的各种实体和技术障碍，在伊利诺伊州被错误定罪并随后被监禁的无辜者在寻求法律补救时受挫[。]”为了纠正这一点不公正，大会创建了一份无罪证明（“COI”）请愿书，为被错误定罪的人提供了获得监禁时间的经济救济的机会。申诉人必须证明他们“没有通过 [他们] 自己的行为自愿导致或导致 [他们] 被定罪。” 值得注意的是，立法机关没有提供“自愿”的定义，让法院可以自由给出自己的定义。尽管立法机关承认“实质性和技术性障碍”阻止被错误定罪的个人获得救济，伊利诺伊州法院通过“自愿”一词施加了此类障碍。在某些情况下，法院通过将其完全从法规分析中删除来忽略该关键术语；在其他情况下，法院使用“自愿”来拒绝 COI。在司法部门看来，无论情况如何，个人在认罪或接受认罪协议时“自愿导致或导致”他们被定罪。这种解释忽略了一个人的清白，他的供词是在伪装成理性选择的情况下被胁迫或接受认罪协议的。尽管授予 COI“通常在法院的合理裁量权范围内”，但伊利诺伊州司法机构不恰当地强加了一个文本中没有的条件，根据其逻辑结论，该条件将拒绝向无辜者提供 COI。本评论探讨了第 2-702 节的目的，考虑“自愿”行为，并阐明司法受挫的影响。Wayne Washington 的案例体现了司法机构滥用自由裁量权及其强加的实质性和技术性障碍，伊利诺伊州立法机构试图通过颁布第 2-702 条来克服这些障碍。最后，该评论认为 COI 是对被错误定罪的个人的唯一充分补救措施，并提出了立法和司法解决方案。