Johnathan L. Kvanvig describes this book as an exercise in metatheology: an attempt to provide a framework for evaluating competing views about what is fundamental in theology. At the core of Kvanvig’s framework is the idea that ‘starting points’ for theologies ‘generate’ aspects of theologies, to which more must be added in order to arrive at adequate complete theologies.Kvanvig focuses on three starting points for theology, expressed as claims about divine essence:(CT) Fundamentally, a god is an asymmetric source of all else.(WWT) Fundamentally, a god is a being that is maximally worthy of supreme worship.(PBT) Fundamentally, a god is a supremely perfect being.Kvanvig takes these central claims to be, respectively, descriptive, evaluative, and normative.In order to assess the adequacy of these starting points, Kvanvig proposes two criteria: first, these starting points should ‘generate’ monotheism, personality, and (maybe) lack of embodiment; and, second, these starting points should ‘generate’ their competitors.The bulk of the book is devoted to an argument for the claim that, assessed against just these criteria, (PBT) comes in last, with (CT) either tied with or perhaps narrowly ahead of (WWT).Kvanvig does discuss a fourth option, which he calls ‘metatheological anti-fundamentalism’ (MAF). There are many forms that this option might take: perhaps a ‘combination’ of more than one of (CT), (WWT), and (PBT); perhaps a ‘subset’ containing more than one of (CT), (WWT), and (PBT); or perhaps even the view that no features of God are more basic or more fundamental than others. I think that, ultimately, Kvanvig evinces sympathy for something like the following view: (KV) Fundamentally, a god is an asymmetric source of all else that is maximally worthy of supreme worship.With this brief synopsis in hand, we turn to some of the worries that one might have about the views that Kvanvig develops.First, it is not clear that ‘metatheology’ is a good label for Kvanvig’s project. In particular, it seems odd in light of the analogy that Kvanvig tries to draw with metaethics. If we took that analogy seriously, we might suppose that the key question for metaethics concerns the choice between the following starting points:(C) Fundamentally, we should maximize good.(D) Fundamentally, we should act rightly.(V) Fundamentally, we should act virtuously.But, at least on many accounts, this choice is one of the central concerns of (normative) ethics rather than metaethics. And, at least on this analogy, it seems that what Kvanvig offers is squarely located in theology, rather than in anything that deserves to be called ‘metatheology.’Second, the idea that particular theologies have (potentially different) ‘starting points’ is one that admits of examination. Since Kvanvig draws explicit parallels between theological theorizing and scientific theorizing, it is worth recalling two prominent distinctions that philosophers of science draw: (i) the distinction between theorizing as process and theory as product, and (ii) the (possibly related) distinction between context of discovery and context of justification. It is obvious that, when we think about process and context of discovery, we may be thinking about starting points, but it is also obvious that those starting points need have no significance at all when it comes to product and context of justification. Equally, it seems clear that, when we think about product and context of justification, it is hard to point to anything that deserves the label ‘starting point.’ In principle perhaps, we might take the axioms in a best axiomatisation of a theory to be starting points; in principle, compactness of best axiomatisation is one dimension of the simplicity of a theory. However, given that Kvanvig acknowledges the holistic nature of the assessment of product and context of justification, it seems that there is no foothold for his kinds of starting points on the side of product and context of justification. The points that I have just made have some significance for some of the details of Kvanvig’s discussion. For example, he rules out:(PAT) God is pure act.as a candidate starting point for theology on grounds that invoke process and context of discovery. But those are insufficient grounds to refuse Thomism a seat at the table once we turn to product and context of justification. Kvanvig says that an approach that started with (PAT) would be as inadequate as an account that started with the claim that gold is the element with atomic number 79 (41). But, in fact, the claim that gold is the element with atomic number 79 is exactly the central claim to make in your theory about (the essential nature of) gold. Kvanvig also says that (PAT) is a ‘philosophical headscratcher’ (40) as a starting point, even if it makes sense in the theory in which it is embedded. But—all other considerations aside—this complaint has no interest in context of discovery and no force once we turn to context of justification.Third, the concepts of ‘generation’ and ‘derivation’ with which Kvanvig works also admit of examination, particularly in light of the distinctions mentioned in the preceding paragraph. Kvanvig takes pains to explain that, for him, ‘derivation’ can be either monotonic or non-monotonic. That is, when he considers what can be ‘derived’ or ‘generated’ from the claims that are the focus of his attention, he is not just concerned with the logical consequences of those claims, but also with what might be called ‘ampliative’ consequences of those claims. Set aside the thought that ‘ampliative consequence’ is merely enthymematic logical consequence. While it then seems right to think that, on the side of process and context of discovery, there is ampliative inference, it seems wrong to think that, on the side of product and justification, there is ampliative consequence. When we axiomatise, the only relation that we employ is logical consequence. Kvanvig notes a ‘holistic/atomistic’ distinction between ‘the conditions under which a [theory] is supported, confirmed or implicated by a given total system of information’ and ‘[the conditions under which] one has a reason for a given claim, a basis for inferring it, or some degree of confirmation for it’ (ix). But, while we have support, confirmation, implication, and reason in both contexts of discovery and contexts of justification, we have only bases for inferring in contexts of discovery. The distinction that Kvanvig draws crosscuts the distinctions needed.Alongside these rather high-level worries about Kvanvig’s project, there are also lower-level worries about some of the details of his arguments.Consider, for example, Kvanvig’s argument for the claim that monotheism clearly follows from (CT). As Kvanvig notes, at most one being can stand in the relation of being the asymmetrical source of all else to everything else. Moreover, according to Kvanvig, if we try giving a standard collective reading of the claim that the gods are the source of all else, we will locate the agency of the collective intentional action of the gods in the individual gods, so that the collectivity is agential only by courtesy, as in a musical performance by an orchestra. But if we are allowed to move to nonstandard collective readings—as, perhaps, in the Christian doctrine of the Trinity—then it becomes controversial whether the resulting view is really polytheistic. And if there is the possibility of conflict between the gods, then we face the Problem of the Pantheon, that is, the problem of reducing the exaltedness of deity to lamentable displays of the foibles and follies of human society. All of this argument is rather swift. To start with, we might wonder why we should prefer (CT) to: (CT*) Fundamentally, a god is a source of all else that has a source.Adopting this principle would block the immediate logical inference to monotheism. And, this early in the discussion, it is not clear why, for example, we should assume that it is not the case that, for example, numbers are independent necessary existents. More strongly, if we have any reason at all to think that there are numbers, then we have reason to suppose that they are independent necessary existents. For, on the assumption that there are numbers that God makes, we have to suppose—in my view, arguably incoherently—that, in the order of explanation, and perhaps even in the order of causation, prior to making the numbers, God was neither one nor many. Once we have come this far, we can go on to note that the further considerations that Kvanvig advances are not very impressive. There are many who think that, for example, institutions are not merely agential by courtesy: institutions have intentions that are not constituted from the intentions of their members, and so on. There are many who think that at least some widely accepted versions of the doctrine of the Trinity are polytheistic. There are also many who think that the so-called ‘Problem of the Pantheon’ is overstated: it is not too hard to suppose that a collection of very powerful, very wise, very good beings whose wills sometimes came into conflict would not exhibit the foibles and fallibilities of the members of, for example, the Greek pantheon.Here is another small example. Against Mark Johnston’s claim that, on the assumption that a separate creation has positive value, the value of the Highest One is less than the value of the Highest One plus a separate creation, Kvanvig objects that endorsement of this claim requires an inventive and non-Cantorian approach to value theory and the mathematics of infinite numbers (since, on a standard approach, the value of the Highest One is infinite, the value of the separate creation is finite, and the sum of infinite and finite is infinite). Setting aside pedantic worries (e.g., that, plausibly, on a Cantorian approach, the value of God will exceed all cardinal values), the important point to note is that the now not-so-recent literature on Pascal’s wager has already spawned a wide range of approaches that are able to make sense of the claim that Johnston makes. To give just one example, those who suppose that God and creatures cannot possibly lie on the same scale might think that value is vectorial: each value has the form ⟨d,t⟩, where d=divine value, c=creaturely value, d is either 1 (for the divine or a fusion that includes the divine), or 0 (for anything that does not have the divine as a part), and c is some real value, positive or negative. Values are lexically ordered: anything which has a 1 in the first slot of its vector trumps anything that has a 0 in the first slot of its vector, and, where things have the same values in the first slot of their vectors, higher values in the second slot trump lower values in the second slot. Finally, mereological fusions of separate things all of which have values themselves have values that sum over the values of their parts.

中文翻译：

---

描绘神灵：元神学方法

Johnathan L. Kvanvig 将这本书描述为元神学的练习：试图提供一个框架来评估关于什么是神学基础的相互竞争的观点。Kvanvig 框架的核心是这样的想法，即神学的“起点”“产生”神学的各个方面，必须添加更多的内容才能达到足够完整的神学。Kvanvig 专注于神学的三个起点，表达为主张关于神圣的本质：（CT）从根本上说，神是所有其他事物的不对称来源。（WWT）从根本上说，神是最值得至高无上的崇拜的存在。（PBT）从根本上说，神是至高无上的完美存在。 Kvanvig 将这些中心主张分别视为描述性、评价性和规范性。为了评估这些起点的充分性，Kvanvig 提出了两个标准：首先，这些起点应该“产生”一神论、个性和（也许）缺乏体现；其次，这些起点应该“产生”他们的竞争对手。本书的大部分内容都用于论证这样的主张，即根据这些标准进行评估，（PBT）排在最后，（CT）与或也许略高于 (WWT)。Kvanvig 确实讨论了第四种选择，他称之为“元神学反原教旨主义”(MAF)。此选项可能采用多种形式：可能是 (CT)、(WWT) 和 (PBT) 中不止一种的“组合”；可能是包含 (CT)、(WWT) 和 (PBT) 中的一个以上的“子集”；或者甚至认为上帝的特征没有比其他特征更基本或更基本的观点。我认为，最终，Kvanvig 表达了对以下观点的同情：（KV）从根本上说，一个神是所有其他事物的不对称来源，最值得至高无上的崇拜。有了这个简短的概要，我们转向人们可能对 Kvanvig 发展的观点的一些担忧。首先，尚不清楚' “元神学”是 Kvanvig 项目的一个很好的标签。特别是，鉴于 Kvanvig 试图用元伦理学进行类比，这似乎很奇怪。如果我们认真对待这个类比，我们可能会假设元伦理学的关键问题涉及以下起点之间的选择：（C）从根本上说，我们应该最大化善。（D）从根本上说，我们应该正确行事。（V）从根本上说，我们应该以美德行事。但是，至少在许多方面，这种选择是（规范）伦理学而非元伦理学的核心关注点之一。而且，至少在这个类比中，看起来 Kvanvig 所提供的东西恰好位于神学中，而不是任何值得称为“元神学”的东西。其次，特定神学具有（可能不同的）“起点”的观点是一个值得检验的观点。由于 Kvanvig 在神学理论化和科学理论化之间进行了明确的比较，因此值得回顾科学哲学家所得出的两个显着区别：（i）作为过程的理论化和作为产品的理论之间的区别，以及（ii）（可能相关的）两者之间的区别发现的背景和证明的背景。很明显，当我们考虑发现的过程和背景时，我们可能会考虑起点，但同样明显的是，当涉及到产品和论证背景时，这些起点根本没有意义。同样，很明显，当我们考虑产品和理由背景时，很难指出任何值得贴上“起点”标签的东西。也许在原则上，我们可以将理论的最佳公理化中的公理作为起点；原则上，最佳公理化的紧凑性是理论简单性的一个维度。然而，鉴于 Kvanvig 承认对产品和理由的评估的整体性，他在产品和理由方面的出发点似乎没有立足点。我刚才提出的观点对于Kv​​anvig讨论的一些细节具有一定的意义。例如，他排除了：（PAT）上帝是纯粹的行为。作为神学的候选起点，基于调用过程和发现的背景。但是，一旦我们转向产品和理由的背景，这些都不足以拒绝托马斯主义在谈判桌上占有一席之地。Kvanvig 说，以 (PAT) 开头的方法与以黄金是原子序数为 79 (41) 的元素开头的说法一样不充分。但是，事实上，金是原子序数为 79 的元素的说法恰恰是您关于金（的本质）理论的核心主张。Kvanvig 还说 (PAT) 作为一个起点是一个“哲学上的头脑风暴者”(40)，即使它在它所嵌入的理论中是有意义的。但是——撇开所有其他考虑——这种抱怨对发现的背景没有兴趣，一旦我们转向证明的背景就没有力量。第三，Kvanvig 工作的“生成”和“派生”的概念也允许检验，特别是在参照前款所述之区分。Kvanvig 煞费苦心地解释说，对他来说，“推导”可以是单调的，也可以是非单调的。也就是说，当他考虑可以从他关注的焦点断言中“导出”或“生成”什么时，他不仅关心这些断言的逻辑结果，而且还关心所谓的“扩充性”这些索赔的后果。抛开“增幅后果”仅仅是韵律逻辑后果的想法。虽然这样认为似乎是正确的，在发现的过程和背景方面，存在放大推理，认为在产品和证明方面，存在放大结果似乎是错误的。当我们公理化时，我们使用的唯一关系是逻辑结果。Kvanvig 注意到“一个[理论]被一个给定的整体信息系统支持、证实或暗示的条件”和“一个人有理由提出一个给定主张的[条件]”之间的“整体/原子”区别，推断它的基础，或某种程度的确认' (ix)。但是，虽然我们在发现的上下文和证明的上下文中都有支持、确认、暗示和推理，但我们只有在发现的上下文中进行推断的基础。Kvanvig 画出的区别横切了所需的区别。除了对 Kvanvig 项目的这些相当高级别的担忧之外，还有对他论证的一些细节的较低级别的担忧。例如，考虑 Kvanvig 的论证，即一神论显然来自 (CT)。正如 Kvanvig 指出的那样，至多一个存在可以站在一种关系中，成为所有其他事物的不对称来源。此外，根据 Kvanvig 的说法，如果我们尝试对众神是万物之源这一说法进行标准的集体解读，我们就会将众神集体意向行为的代理定位于个体神明，因此集体是代理人只能出于礼貌，就像在管弦乐队的音乐表演中一样。但是，如果我们被允许转向非标准的集体阅读——也许，在三位一体的基督教教义中——那么由此产生的观点是否真的是多神论就变得有争议了。如果诸神之间存在冲突的可能性，那么我们就会面临万神殿的问题，即把神的崇高降低为人类社会弱点和愚蠢的可悲表现的问题。所有这些论点都相当迅速。首先，我们可能想知道为什么我们应该更喜欢 (CT) 而不是： (CT*) 从根本上说，神是所有其他有来源的来源。采用这一原则会阻止对一神论的直接逻辑推理。而且，在讨论的早期，不清楚为什么，例如，我们应该假设情况并非如此，例如，数字是独立必然存在的。更强烈的是，如果我们有任何理由认为存在数字，那么我们就有理由假设它们是独立的必然存在物。因为，假设有上帝创造的数字，我们不得不假设——在我看来，可以说是不连贯的——按照解释的顺序，甚至可能按照因果关系的顺序，在创造数字之前，上帝是既不是一个也不是很多。一旦我们走到这一步，我们就可以继续注意到 Kvanvig 提出的进一步考虑并不是很令人印象深刻。许多人认为，例如，制度不仅仅是礼貌的代理：制度的意图不是由其成员的意图构成的，等等。许多人认为，至少有一些被广泛接受的三位一体教义版本是多神教的。也有许多人认为所谓的“万神殿问题”被夸大了：不难假设一群非常强大、非常聪明、非常善良的人，他们的意志有时会发生冲突，不会表现出例如，希腊万神殿成员的弱点和错误。这是另一个小例子。Mark Johnston 声称，假设单独的创造物具有正价值，最高的价值小于最高的价值加上单独的创造物，Kvanvig 反对这一主张的认可需要创造性的和非-康托尔对价值理论和无限数数学的方法（因为，在标准方法中，最高者的价值是无限的，单独创造的价值是有限的，无限和有限的总和是无限的）。抛开迂腐的担忧（例如，在康托尔的方法中，上帝的价值似乎将超过所有基本价值），需要注意的重要一点是关于帕斯卡赌注的现在不那么新的文献已经产生了广泛的影响能够理解约翰斯顿提出的主张的一系列方法。仅举一个例子，那些认为上帝和生物不可能处于同一尺度的人可能会认为价值是矢量的：每个价值都有形式⟨d，t⟩，其中d=神圣价值，c=创造价值，d要么是 1（对于神性或包含神性的融合），要么是 0（对于任何没有神性作为一部分的东西），c 是一些真实的价值，正数或负数。值按词法排序：在其向量的第一个槽中具有 1 的任何事物都胜过在其向量的第一个槽中具有 0 的任何事物，并且，如果事物在其向量的第一个槽中具有相同的值，则第二个槽中的较高值胜过较低的值第二个插槽中的值。最后，独立事物的分体学融合，所有事物本身都具有价值，其价值总和在其各部分的价值之上。