Important types of contractual relationships—among them those between integrated product manufacturers and their suppliers—are neither fully transactional nor fully relational. The agreements that govern these relationships incorporate highly detailed written terms that focus not only on what is promised but also on the details of how it is to be achieved and how suppliers’ actions will be monitored and responded to over the life of the agreement. Together with the implicit relational contracts that support their operation, these provisions create an economic hybrid that lies between markets and hierarchies, a set of relatively standard institutional arrangements that give buyers the right (but not the obligation) to exercise a package of quasi-integration rights that enables them to obtain many of the most important benefits of vertical integration while simultaneously reaping most of the core benefits of outsourcing. The contract provisions used to govern these relationships are termed here “managerial provisions” because they employ the techniques of intra-firm hierarchy that managers use to organize relationships and increase productivity within firms. This article focuses on a subset of these provisions, namely those that are analogous to the eighteen management practices that the World Management Survey (WMS) reveals are closely associated with persistent performance differences across similarly situated enterprises. After documenting the convergence between these practices and the terms of procurement contracts, the article suggests that the contract governance regime these practices create is well designed to support the creation and maintenance of cooperative relationships, strengthen the force of network governance, and scaffold the emergence of the type of inter-firm process-based trust that is associated with better supplier performance. More generally, this article concludes that in the modern economy, where the value of so many types of contracts—from research and development alliances to business process outsourcing agreements and beyond—depends on employees of the contracting entities working together much as if they worked for a single firm, lawyers would be well advised to look to the broad array of managerial techniques successfully used within firms (not only those based on WMS practices) to develop new ways to better govern transactions between firms.

中文翻译：

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管理承包：初步研究

重要类型的合同关系——包括集成产品制造商与其供应商之间的合同关系——既不是完全交易性的，也不是完全相关的。管理这些关系的协议包含非常详细的书面条款，这些条款不仅关注承诺的内容，还关注如何实现承诺的细节，以及如何在协议有效期内监控和响应供应商的行为。连同支持其运作的隐性关系契约，这些规定创造了一种介于市场和等级制度之间的经济混合体，一套相对标准的制度安排，赋予买方权利（但不是义务）行使一揽子准整合权，使他们能够获得纵向整合的许多最重要的好处，同时收获纵向整合的大部分核心好处外包。用于管理这些关系的合同条款在这里被称为“管理条款”，因为它们采用了公司内部等级制度的技术，经理们使用这些技术来组织关系并提高公司内部的生产率。本文重点介绍这些条款的子集，即类似于世界管理调查 (WMS) 揭示的十八种管理实践的条款，这些实践与处于类似情况的企业之间的持续绩效差异密切相关。在记录了这些实践与采购合同条款之间的趋同之后，文章建议，这些实践创建的合同治理制度经过精心设计，可以支持合作关系的建立和维护，加强网络治理的力量，并为采购合同的出现提供支持。与更好的供应商绩效相关的公司间基于流程的信任类型。更一般地说，本文得出的结论是，在现代经济中，如此多类型合同的价值——从研发联盟到业务流程外包协议等等——取决于合同实体的员工一起工作，就像他们为公司工作一样。一家公司，