This paper offers a defense of a much-maligned Leibnizian argument for the Principle of Sufficient Reason, the principle according to which whatever is has a sufficient reason or explanation. While Leibniz’s argument is widely thought to rely on a question-begging premise, the paper offers a wholly original and non-question-begging defense of that premise, a defense that Leibniz did not anticipate. The paper does not present this defense of Leibniz's argument as an interpretation of Leibniz; rather, the paper—more modestly in one way, less modestly in another—simply claims that this argument succeeds.

中文翻译：

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充足理由律的新辩护

这篇论文为莱布尼茨关于充分理由原则的一个备受诟病的论证提供了辩护，根据该原则，任何事物都有充分的理由或解释。虽然莱布尼茨的论点被广泛认为依赖于一个回避问题的前提，但该论文提供了对该前提的完全原创且非回避问题的辩护，这是莱布尼茨没有预料到的辩护。该论文并未将对莱布尼茨论点的辩护作为对莱布尼茨的解释；相反，这篇论文——在某种程度上更谦虚，在另一种方面更不谦虚——只是声称这个论点是成功的。