Brandon Look’s introduction to this long-awaited collection points to the range of Leibniz’s writings unknown to Kant and his contemporaries and to Kant’s general dislike of historical scholarship. Kant apparently owned not a single book authored by Leibniz, or for that matter by Spinoza or Locke, and only one volume of Christian Wolff, his Ontologia. Yet the name index of the Kant corpus renders Leibniz, Wolff, along with Newton as the most frequently cited authors.One might well imagine that, from Kant’s perspective, Leibniz was the overestimated author of a mannered, fanciful, and generally incredible system, featuring ingeniously wrought monads and meticulous divine planning, a system that addressed no one’s serious concerns about moral good and evil, human agency, or providence and the future. Reciprocally, if Leibniz had happened on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, having been out of touch for sixty-five years, he would likely have dismissed it as a poorly constructed and indecisive work that proved nothing. Had they had the patience for a conversation, the two would have agreed on a few things: that corporeal atoms cannot constitute the ultimate units of reality, that the mechanical philosophy—and even Newton’s version of it—nevertheless gives good predictions, and that there is life on other planets. But to stop with these reflections would not do justice to the importance of Leibniz as an opponent for Kant and even as, in some respects, a positive influence. As Robert Butts (1986: 6) observed, “Like Leibniz, [Kant] wanted a system that enshrined the mechanical method as the method of science; he also wanted an account that would save teleology, purposiveness, meaningfulness.” Leibniz’s “double government” of reason and necessity mutated into Kant’s double world of purposive actions and mere happenings and into the dualism of his ideal moral community versus the ambition-fueled rough-and-tumble of historical states and doings.A highlight of the book is Ursula Goldenbaum’s insight- and information-packed opening essay on German intellectual culture leading up to Kant. Goldenbaum takes us through the threat to Christianity posed by Leibniz’s theory of the preestablished harmony between soul and body and the Pietist opposition to it, and to the theologians’ rejection of such basic principles as inertia, the conservation of force, and mechanism on the grounds that it was up to God what happened in physics. Despite his not very successful efforts to be current with and contribute to eighteenth-century mathematical physics, Kant’s strenuous commitment to free will and his relegation of mechanism to the appearances reflect his Pietist background. Eric Watkins discusses in further detail Kant’s s explorations of the concepts of essence and existence in his Nova Dilucidatio of 1755 and his The Only Possible Argument for the Existence of God of 1763, and his alignment with the Pietist philosopher Christian August Crusius against Leibniz-Wolff determinism. Although Watkins’s description of Kant as breaking with rationalism thereafter is understandable, one might suggest that Kant’s break is more precisely described as a new refusal to discuss traditional philosophical problems in an analytical way independent of human interests.Most chapters engage with Kant more substantially than with Leibniz, though Donald Rutherford, in an essay principally devoted to interpreting Leibniz’s theory of space, summarizes Kant’s understanding and misunderstanding of Leibniz’s use of the identity of indiscernibles and his account of the relationship between perception and cognition. Controversially, because Newtonian space would seem equally a priori, and because Kant thought he had laid waste to Leibnizian space-theory through the consideration of incongruent counterparts, Rutherford concludes that Leibniz and Kant share the “assumption of space as ideal and the a priori form of outer perception” (111). Leibniz’s interesting claim that “similars” can only be distinguished when coperceived (cited on p. 98) might have made a good starting point for a defense of Rutherford’s thesis. Alison Laywine poses a novel and interesting question: What, in the view of Leibniz and Kant, does God need to do to create a world? In the critical philosophy, where origin stories are off limits, the “world” comes to mean for Kant “not created substances that owe their existence to God … [but] parts that we represent by perceptions.” The “world” for us is the part of God’s transcendental knowledge that we can “rationally reconstruct by interpreting our perceptions as connected by laws” (132–33). This is illuminating: Hume’s possible scenarios of random happenings are accordingly not images of a “world” at all.Nicholas Stang argues that Leibniz at least attempted to think through how monads project into a world of empirical objects, or into our individual experiences, producing various accounts, none of which was satisfactory, while Kant was entitled as a critical philosopher wisely to declare the noumenon-phenomenon relationship unknowable in principle. Anja Jauernig returns to Kant’s accusation that Leibniz confused cognition with perception. Where did Kant get that from, and what was he driving at? Probably via Wolff and Baumgarten, from Leibniz’s famous assignment of only two basic faculties to the soul: perception and appetition and the teachings on confused perception of the “Meditations on Knowledge, Truth and Ideas.”Apparently, Kant realized only in the controversy with Eberhard that Leibniz never made the drastically confused claim that we perceive monads-as-unextended-primary-substances through the ordinary mechanisms of visual perception. Martha Brandt Bolton discusses the perception-cognition issue and the monads-matter relationship in her chapter on the Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection, pointing to Kant’s “apparent lack of information about what his predecessor actually holds,” and amplifies Goldenbaum’s observation that Kant’s grasp of formal mechanics is tenuous. Paul Guyer examines Kant’s late-in-life recognition of a substantially different Leibniz who, rather than confusing cognition and perception, proposed an unknowable substrate for the experienced world. Leibniz’s contrast between the “realm of grace” and the “realm of nature” are echoed in Kant’s contrast between the intelligible world, the moral community, and the empirical world of science and the everyday. Guyer contrasts Kantian teleology as a regulative principle with Leibniz’s constitutive parallelism, whereby the mechanical order tends through divine planning to maturation, various forms of fulfillment, and deserved reward and punishment. Desmond Hogan analyzes Kant’s theory of divine and secondary causation, implicitly disagreeing with Goldenbaum in characterizing the early Kant as a necessitarian undergoing a conversion to free will but he ascribes to Kant a “mature theory of God’s relation to creaturely causality.” According to Hogan, “His libertarian theory of freedom is never presented as justifying a deistic dilution of creaturely dependence” (294). While Kant had reason to avoid presenting his account of free will as contradicting a fundamental theological principle, it is hard to see the mature Kant as endorsing any determinate position about God’s agency. Patrick Kain’s study of the divine will shows us how Kant as critical philosopher nevertheless regards the “holy will” as a concept good to think with and how the ascription of a possible good moral will to human beings benefits from the example of the alleged intelligibility of God’s moral will. Andrew Chignell’s lively and clearly written essay takes us through Leibniz’s various attempts to preserve the doctrine of the world as perfect clockwork with the need to avoid contradicting scripture and reputable theology on miracles and argues that Kant employs the possibility of our “breaking the laws of nature” in free will. This raises the question whether Kant means this possibility seriously (in which case he is not a compatibilist, contrary to his claim that the actions of the criminal are in principle determined and predictable but at the same time free), or whether lawbreaking agency is only a concept good to think with.The collection is focused on metaphysics, specifically on phenomenalism and idealism, causality, divinity, and space and time. It is, as Herder said of Kant’s First Critique, a “hard chew.” I suspect most readers will direct their attention to topics of their individual interest rather than attempting to read through the book as a whole. A number of interesting points of Leibniz-Kant comparison are not addressed in the volume, or not with the same thoroughness, notably the problems of evil and human wrongdoing, the appeals of both Leibniz and Kant to Plato and Aristotle, their objections to Locke, their conceptions of selfhood and identity, their different structures of argumentation, and their views on the relationship of mathematics to philosophy.The narrow focus is somewhat regrettable, as the individual essays are very long, running to about thirty pages each. The temptation with such generous allowances is for authors to go round and round with the topic, even when a substantial literature on it already exists, or when readers would benefit from a more efficient survey. While it is admittedly difficult to balance thorough research and responsible citation with reader-friendliness, avoiding condescension and oversimplification, I often felt a chapter could have been sharply reduced in length with no loss to its intellectual content and much greater usefulness, including to our graduate students.Additionally, I would have appreciated a greater sensitivity in some chapters to issues of chronology and audience. While we no longer take a precritical and a critical Kant for granted, it is helpful to distinguish between at least three groups of writings: the varied pre-1770 books and essays where Kant was trying to find his professional footing and experimenting with popular philosophy while practicing more academic forms of analysis; the Lectures on Metaphysics of the 1760s to 1790s, which Kant was paid to deliver to teenage students in a university dominated by the theological faculty; and the critical philosophy, written for Kant’s peers with the intent to reform philosophy from the ground up. So Kant considered it his responsibility in his lectures to present the traditional metaphysical positions and controversies regarding God, the soul, and the world, deftly adding in some of his own doubts and opinions. University teaching was “private,” in Kant’s view, and so constrained by the wishes of the employer; book publication was “public” and, for pushing his qualified readers out of the immaturity he attributes to the “overwhelming majority of mankind” in the essay “What Is Enlightenment?,” the more challenging, the better. While the commentator has every right to explore the fine points of Kant’s more scholastic discussions of, for example, the extent of divine agency, it is helpful to point out that he was not invested in the outcome of debates on these topics, and that the thrust of the critical philosophy is to their avoidance.

中文翻译：

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莱布尼茨和康德

布兰登·卢克 (Brandon Look) 对这部期待已久的合集的介绍指出了康德和他的同时代人所不知道的莱布尼茨著作的范围，以及康德对历史学术的普遍厌恶。康德显然没有一本莱布尼茨、斯宾诺莎或洛克的著作，只有一卷克里斯蒂安·沃尔夫的著作《本体论》。然而，康德语料库的名称索引将莱布尼茨、沃尔夫和牛顿列为最常被引用的作者。人们很可能会想象，从康德的角度来看，莱布尼茨是一个彬彬有礼、充满幻想且通常令人难以置信的系统的作者被高估了，其特点是巧妙地打造了单子和一丝不苟的神圣计划，这个系统没有解决任何人对道德善恶、人类能动性或天意和未来的严重关切。反过来，如果莱布尼茨偶然发现了康德的《纯粹理性批判》，他已经 65 年与外界脱节，他很可能会把它视为一部结构不佳、优柔寡断、什么也证明不了的作品。如果他们有耐心交谈，两人会在一些事情上达成一致：有形的原子不能构成现实的最终单位，机械哲学——甚至牛顿的版本——尽管如此给出了很好的预测，并且有是其他星球上的生命。但是，仅仅停留在这些思考上，并不能公正地评价莱布尼茨作为康德的反对者，甚至在某些方面对他产生积极影响的重要性。正如 Robert Butts (1986: 6) 所观察到的，“像莱布尼茨一样，[康德]想要一个将机械方法奉为科学方法的体系；他还想要一个可以保存目的论的帐户，目的性、意义性。” 莱布尼茨的理性和必然性的“双重政府”转变为康德的有目的的行动和纯粹的事件的双重世界，转变为他理想的道德共同体与历史状态和行为的野心推动的混乱的二元论。是乌苏拉·戈登鲍姆 (Ursula Goldenbaum) 关于导致康德的德国知识文化的洞察力和信息丰富的开篇文章。Goldenbaum 带我们了解了莱布尼茨关于灵魂与身体之间预先建立的和谐的理论以及虔诚派反对它对基督教构成的威胁，以及神学家拒绝惯性、力守恒和机械原理等基本原则的威胁物理学中发生的事情取决于上帝。尽管康德努力与 18 世纪的数学物理学保持同步并为之做出贡献，但他的努力并不十分成功，但他对自由意志的坚定承诺以及他将机制降格为表象反映了他的虔诚教背景。埃里克·沃特金斯 (Eric Watkins) 在他 1755 年的 Nova Dilucidatio 和他的 1763 年的上帝存在的唯一可能论证中更详细地讨论了康德对本质和存在概念的探索，以及他与虔诚派哲学家克里斯蒂安·奥古斯特·克鲁修斯 (Christian August Crusius) 一起反对莱布尼茨-沃尔夫 (Leibniz-Wolff)决定论。尽管沃特金斯之后将康德描述为与理性主义决裂是可以理解的，但人们可能会认为康德的决裂更准确地描述为一种新的拒绝以独立于人类利益的分析方式讨论传统哲学问题。大多数章节更多地涉及康德而不是莱布尼茨，尽管唐纳德卢瑟福在一篇主要致力于解释莱布尼茨空间理论的文章中总结了康德对莱布尼茨使用不可辨别的身份的理解和误解以及他对感知与认知之间关系的解释. 有争议的是，因为牛顿空间看起来同样是先验的，并且因为康德认为他通过考虑不一致的对应物而废除了莱布尼茨的空间理论，卢瑟福得出结论，莱布尼茨和康德共享“空间作为理想的假设和先验形式外在感知”（111）。莱布尼茨有趣的说法是“相似物”只有在共同感知时才能被区分（引用于第 98 页）可能为卢瑟福的论文辩护提供了一个很好的起点。Alison Laywine 提出了一个新颖而有趣的问题：在莱布尼茨和康德看来，上帝需要做什么来创造一个世界？在批判哲学中，起源故事是不受限制的，“世界”对康德来说意味着“不是由于上帝而存在的受造实体……[而是]我们通过感知所代表的部分。” 对我们来说，“世界”是上帝超验知识的一部分，我们可以“通过将我们的感知解释为由法律联系起来来理性地重建”（132-33）。这很有启发性：休谟的随机事件的可能场景因此根本不是“世界”的图像。尼古拉斯·斯坦认为莱布尼茨至少试图思考单子如何投射到经验对象的世界，或投射到我们的个人经验，产生各种说法，没有一个是令人满意的，而康德有权作为批判哲学家明智地宣布本体-现象关系在原则上是不可知的。Anja Jauernig 回到了康德的指责，即莱布尼茨将认知与知觉混为一谈。康德是从哪里得到的，他的目的是什么？大概是通过沃尔夫和鲍姆加滕，从莱布尼茨著名的仅赋予灵魂两个基本能力：知觉和欲望，以及“知识、真理和思想沉思”中关于混淆知觉的教义。显然，康德只是在与埃伯哈德的争论中才意识到莱布尼茨从未提出过这样一个极其混乱的说法，即我们通过普通的视觉感知机制将单子视为未扩展的主要物质。玛莎·勃兰特·博尔顿 (Martha Brandt Bolton) 在她关于反思概念的两栖性一章中讨论了感知-认知问题和单子-物质关系，指出康德“明显缺乏关于他的前任实际持有的信息”，并放大了戈登鲍姆的观察，即康德掌握了形式力学是脆弱的。Paul Guyer 考察了康德晚年对一个截然不同的莱布尼茨的认识，莱布尼茨没有混淆认知和知觉，而是为经验世界提出了一个不可知的基础。莱布尼茨在“恩典王国”和“自然王国”之间的对比与康德在理智世界、道德共同体以及科学和日常生活的经验世界之间的对比相呼应。Guyer 将康德目的论与莱布尼茨的构成性平行论进行了对比，作为一种规范性原则，借此，机械秩序通过神圣的计划趋向于成熟，各种形式的实现，以及应得的奖赏和惩罚。Desmond Hogan 分析了康德的神圣和次要因果关系理论，含蓄地不同意 Goldenbaum 将早期康德描述为正在转变为自由意志的必然论者，但他将“上帝与受造物因果关系的成熟理论”归功于康德。根据 Hogan 的说法，“他的自由主义自由理论从未被提出来证明自然神论稀释生物依赖是合理的”（294）。虽然康德有理由避免将他对自由意志的解释描述为与基本神学原则相矛盾，但很难看出成熟的康德赞同关于上帝代理权的任何确定立场。帕特里克·凯恩 (Patrick Kain) 对神圣意志的研究向我们展示了康德作为批判哲学家如何将“神圣意志”视为一个值得思考的概念，以及将可能的良好道德意志归因于人类如何受益于所谓的可理解性的例子上帝的道德意志。Andrew Chignell 生动而清晰的文章带我们了解了莱布尼茨的各种尝试，以保持世界是完美的发条装置的学说，需要避免与圣经和著名的奇迹神学相矛盾，并认为康德利用了我们“打破自然法则”的可能性” 在自由意志中。这就提出了康德是否认真对待这种可能性的问题（在这种情况下他不是相容论者，与他声称罪犯的行为原则上是确定的和可预测的但同时是自由的）或违法行为是否只是一个值得思考的概念相反。该系列侧重于形而上学，特别是现象主义和唯心主义，因果关系、神性、空间和时间。正如赫尔德对康德的《第一批判》所说的那样，它是一个“难以咀嚼的东西”。我怀疑大多数读者会将注意力集中在他们个人感兴趣的主题上，而不是试图通读整本书。莱布尼茨与康德比较的一些有趣的观点没有在书中得到解决，或者没有得到同样彻底的解决，特别是邪恶和人类不法行为的问题，莱布尼茨和康德对柏拉图和亚里士多德的呼吁，他们对洛克的反对，他们对自我和身份的看法，他们不同的论证结构，以及他们对数学与哲学关系的看法。狭窄的焦点有点令人遗憾，因为每篇论文都很长，每篇都有大约三十页。如此慷慨的津贴的诱惑是作者绕着这个话题转来转去，即使已经存在大量关于它的文献，或者当读者会从更有效的调查中受益时。诚然，很难在彻底的研究和负责任的引用与读者友好之间取得平衡，避免居高临下和过于简单化，但我经常觉得一章的长度本可以大幅减少，而不会损失其知识内容和更大的用处，包括对我们的研究生学生。此外，我希望在某些章节中对时间顺序和受众问题更加敏感。虽然我们不再认为前批判的和批判的康德是理所当然的，但区分至少三组著作是有帮助的：康德在 1770 年之前试图找到他的专业立足点并尝试流行哲学的各种书籍和论文，同时练习更多的学术形式的分析；1760 年代至 1790 年代的形而上学讲座，康德在神学院占主导地位的大学里向青少年学生授课；和批判哲学，写给康德的同行，意图从头开始改革哲学。因此，康德认为他的责任是在他的演讲中展示传统的形而上学立场和关于上帝、灵魂的争论，和世界，巧妙地加入了他自己的一些疑问和观点。在康德看来，大学教学是“私人的”，因此受到雇主意愿的限制；书籍出版是“公开的”，为了让合格的读者摆脱他在“什么是启蒙运动？”一文中归因于“绝大多数人”的不成熟，越有挑战性越好。虽然评论员完全有权探索康德更学术性的讨论的要点，例如，神圣代理的范围，但指出他没有投资于这些主题的辩论结果是有帮助的，而且批判哲学的主旨是避免它们。书籍出版是“公开的”，为了让合格的读者摆脱他在“什么是启蒙运动？”一文中归因于“绝大多数人”的不成熟，越有挑战性越好。虽然评论员完全有权探索康德更学术性的讨论的要点，例如，神圣代理的范围，但指出他没有投资于这些主题的辩论结果是有帮助的，而且批判哲学的主旨是避免它们。书籍出版是“公开的”，为了让合格的读者摆脱他在“什么是启蒙运动？”一文中归因于“绝大多数人”的不成熟，越有挑战性越好。虽然评论员完全有权探索康德更学术性的讨论的要点，例如，神圣代理的范围，但指出他没有投资于这些主题的辩论结果是有帮助的，而且批判哲学的主旨是避免它们。