Chance both guides our credences and is an objective feature of the world. How and why we should conform our credences to chance depends on the underlying metaphysical account of what chance is. I use considerations of accuracy (how close your credences come to truth-values) to propose a new way of deferring to chance. The principle I endorse, called the Trust Principle, requires chance to be a good guide to the world, permits modest chances, tells us how to listen to chance even when the chances are modest, and entails but is not entailed by the New Principle. As I show, a rational agent will obey this principle if and only if she expects chance to be at least as accurate as she is on every good way of measuring accuracy. Much of the discussion, and the technical results, extend beyond chance to deference to any kind of expert. Indeed, you will trust someone about a particular question just in case you expect that person to be more accurate than you are about that question.

中文翻译：

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准确、尊重和机会

机会既指导我们的信任，也是世界的客观特征。我们应该如何以及为什么要使我们的信念符合偶然性取决于对偶然性的潜在形而上学解释。我使用准确性的考虑（你的可信度与真值的接近程度）来提出一种推迟机会的新方法。我赞同的原则，称为信任原则，需要机会成为世界的良好指南，允许适度的机会，告诉我们即使机会微不足道也要倾听机会，并且包含但不包含在新原则中。正如我所展示的，当且仅当她期望机会至少与她在衡量准确性的每一种好方法上一样准确时，他才会遵守这一原则。许多讨论和技术结果超出了对任何专家的尊重。的确，关于一个特定的问题，以防万一你期望那个人比你对那个问题更准确。