“I couldn’t stand those books,” my friend Elena said with great vehemence; “all the characters were just horrible.” It was a sunny afternoon in August and, having hiked up Izaraitz Auzoa, we were luncheoning on the grass by a small Basque chalet serving wine to weary hikers. She was talking about My Brilliant Friend, the first book of Elena Ferrante’s quartet The Neapolitan Novels. Her sister, who, unlike her, had found the strength to read all four books, concurred. She was hoping for a happy resolution, she said. There was none. Personally, I love those books for their candor about friendship. Why did my friend hate them so much? There was the Neapolitan Mafia and the brutality that is so often intermingled with poverty, of course. But what rankled more than anything was the fraught relationship between the two main characters: Lenu and Lila. Lenu and Lila love each other intensely, but their friendship is poisoned again and again by the envy each feels for the other. Lenu envies Lila’s unschooled brilliant mind, and Lila envies Lenu’s education, intelligence, and friends. Each feels excruciatingly inferior to the other at times. They go through periods of close friendship and estrangement as a result. It was this envy that so disgusted my friends.Envy is, as Sara Protasi points out in her book The Philosophy of Envy, “condemned by all religious traditions, feared in all societies, repressed by most who feel it, and often kept a secret even to oneself” (2). It is generally thought to be incompatible with love, with being a good person, or with human happiness. The envious are portrayed as languishing away in the shadows under the burden of their all-consuming passion. The first murder in the Bible—Cain slaying Abel—is usually portrayed as being the result of envy. No wonder, then, that my friends were so horrified by the centrality of this emotion in Ferrante’s quartet. What was more surprising, in fact, was that I found it liberating to read about envy so freely admitted to. It was intermingled with deep discomfort and an urge to condemn the envier, of course, but let the one who has never envied throw the first stone.In her beautifully written, fastidiously argued, and empirically informed book on envy, Protasi offers a new and more compassionate view of this maligned emotion. She argues that envy is not always bad but that it might actually be virtuous at times. Envy is an inevitable result of our quest for excellence in any field, she suggests. Excellence is not, indeed cannot be, independent of how other people are doing. Instead, it is by its very nature comparative. In our quest for it we throw a “sidelong glance” (159) at others to see how they are doing. Social comparison is inextricably linked to excelling. There being very few people who believe excellence is a vice, Protasi’s argument that envy isn’t always bad has tremendous force. Envy comes along for the ride whenever we aim to improve ourselves and hone our skills. But what about her stronger claim that envy might actually be good? After all, it is easy to accept that if we cannot help but envy (sometimes) when we are in the business of self-improvement, we cannot be blamed for it. It might be harder to see envy as a virtue.Before making headway on this question, let us first see how Protasi defines envy. According to her, “Envy is an aversive response to a perceived inferiority of disadvantage vis-à-vis a similar other, with regard to a good that is relevant to the sense of identity of the envier. Envy’s unpleasantness motivates the envier to do something about their situation” (29). Envy, incidentally, is not the same as jealousy, even though the two terms are often confounded in American English. Envy, Protasi says, wants what it does not have, but jealousy desires to protect what it has in the face of threatened loss.Because envy has two variables, we get four different kinds of envy, according to Protasi. Here she sets herself apart from earlier philosophers who have posited at most three different kinds. The two variables are focus and control, she says. The focus of envy—namely, what we pay most attention to—might either be the envied object or situation, or the person that we envy. The other variable is control, or, more precisely, perceived control. This refers to one’s assessment of one’s ability to obtain the good that the other person possesses. Combining the two poles of focus and control gives us four different possibilities for envy. First, we have inert envy, where the focus is on the good, but the good is perceived to be unobtainable. Emulative envy is similar insofar as the focus remains on the good, not the person who has the good, but it differs insofar as the envier sees herself capable of obtaining the good. When, instead, the focus is on the person who has the good, we get spiteful envy when the envier perceives the good to be unobtainable, and aggressive envy when it is thought to obtainable. Each kind of envy comes with its own action tendency, or motivation, and way of looking at the envied other. The action tendency is particularly relevant to how we evaluate the emotion overall. Inert envy leads to sulking, emulative envy to self-improvement (or attempting to self-improve at any rate), and spiteful envy to the desire to spoil the good for the other person; aggressive envy motivates stealing the good (43).Looked at this way, emulative envy doesn’t seem so bad. It appears to be bad neither for the envier herself nor for the envied. Protasi concludes that it is neither prudentially nor morally bad. Inert envy isn’t really bad for the envied, but it does seem to be bad for the envier. After all, it is a painful emotion and one that is liable to be intensified by the self-loathing and despair that tends to accompany such an unflattering comparison. One really ought not to feel inert envy, for purely self-interested reasons. Aggressive and spiteful envy are both morally problematic for reasons that need not be elaborated on, as they should be obvious to most. But, in contrast to earlier writers on envy (many of whom are mentioned in the large appendix to the book) who mostly thought envy in all its forms was prudentially (and morally) bad, Protasi acknowledges that the pain of envy is often assuaged in these cases by hope of wresting the good from the rival or of spoiling the good for them. This leads her to suggest that although aggressive envy is clearly morally bad, it is not obviously prudentially bad. Of course, having obtained another’s good by whatever shady means at one’s disposal, one might feel subsequent shame or guilt, but those feelings could quickly be overcome by the satisfaction of possessing the desired good oneself. This may not be what we would like to believe, but it seems to be psychologically realistic. We are, as many social psychologists have shown, given to self-flattering appraisals and confabulations. Someone who acquires another’s good by aggressive means will often have little difficulty persuading himself that he deserved to possess the good in the first place. One might at first wonder why Protasi does not accord the same prudential status to spiteful envy, which she claims is both morally and prudentially bad. After all, spoiling the good for the other might give one the satisfaction of no longer being in an inferior position with respect of her. Protasi, however, seems to think this satisfaction is likely to be short-lived. It also comes with dangers of its own, such as alienating the envied and frightening onlookers, thus potentially leading to social exclusion and isolation. One might point to Iago, spiteful envier par excellence, who came to a sticky end.So how can envy be virtuous, again? Because it is “the only morally and prudentially appropriate response to the comparative lack of important goods” (90). This does not mean that envying virtuously is easy. Quite the contrary. Only emulative envy counts, and only when it is fitting and acted upon in the right way. Here, as elsewhere in the book, there are echoes of Aristotle. Fitting emulative envy must be right about the envied person being in one’s own comparison class and in a superior position. The envied object or situation must be good, and one must be justified in thinking one can level up—that is, obtain the good for oneself—which is only possible, of course, if it is a good that more than one person can possess. Despite these difficulties, many people do manage to envy virtuously, Protasi maintains. As an example, she gives Lenu and Lila, whom she believes envy emulatively.Protasi argues for her view of envy with admirable clarity and attention to detail. In contrast to many works on emotions in philosophy that rely almost exclusively on arguments, anecdotes, and thought examples, Protasi masterfully uses the empirical literature to help make her points. More than once, she rejects a proposal on empirical grounds. At the same time, she shows a vast knowledge of the philosophical literature. I thoroughly enjoyed reading the book; this is often rare for philosophy, which has become an increasingly specialized discipline, making for highly technical and tedious reading. Protasi can, of course, be a bit pedantic herself. By and large, however, I thought she has found an admirable balance between careful reasoning, attention to the ongoing debate and possible objections, and engaging writing and vivid examples.One of the things that shines through in this book is Protasi’s humanity. Here is no moralistic finger wagging but instead a compassionate look at the complexity of human striving, human excellence, and the ubiquitous desire for admiration and respect. This is seen no more clearly than in her tightly argued chapter on love and envy. Envy is not invariably the enemy of love, Saint Paul notwithstanding, she argues. Envy is possible, indeed may be unavoidable, in loving relationships. Not chronic envy, of course, but envy that comes and goes as a life shared changes and evolves.

中文翻译：

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嫉妒的哲学

“我受不了那些书，”我的朋友埃琳娜激动地说。“所有角色都太可怕了。” 那是 8 月一个阳光明媚的下午，我们徒步攀登了 Izaraitz Auzoa，然后在巴斯克小木屋旁的草地上吃午饭，为疲惫的徒步旅行者提供葡萄酒。她在谈论《我的好朋友》，这是埃琳娜·费兰特 (Elena Ferrante) 四重奏那不勒斯小说的第一本书。她的妹妹与她不同，她已经找到了读完所有四本书的力量，同意了。她说，她希望有一个愉快的解决方案。没有。就个人而言，我喜欢这些书，因为它们对友谊的坦率。为什么我的朋友如此讨厌他们？当然，还有那不勒斯黑手党和经常与贫困交织在一起的残暴行为。但最让人恼怒的是两个主角之间令人担忧的关系：Lenu 和 Lila。Lenu 和 Lila 深爱着对方，但他们的友谊一次又一次地因彼此的嫉妒而中毒。Lenu 羡慕 Lila 没有受过教育的聪明才智，而 Lila 也羡慕 Lenu 的教育、智慧和朋友。每个人有时都觉得自己低人一等。结果，他们经历了亲密友谊和疏远的时期。正是这种嫉妒让我的朋友们如此反感。正如萨拉·普罗塔西 (Sara Protasi) 在她的《嫉妒的哲学》一书中指出的那样，嫉妒“受到所有宗教传统的谴责，在所有社会中都令人恐惧，被大多数感受到它的人所压抑，并且常常保守秘密甚至对自己”（2）。它通常被认为与爱情、做一个好人或人类幸福不相容。嫉妒者被描绘成在他们无所不在的激情的重压下在阴影中逐渐消退。圣经中的第一起谋杀案——该隐杀死亚伯——通常被描述为嫉妒的结果。难怪我的朋友们对费兰特四重奏中这种情感的中心地位感到震惊。事实上，更令人惊讶的是，我发现阅读如此自由承认的嫉妒是一种解放。当然，它夹杂着深深的不适和谴责嫉妒者的冲动，但让从未嫉妒过的人先扔石头。对这种被伤害的情绪更有同情心。她认为，嫉妒并不总是坏事，但有时它实际上可能是有益的。她表示，嫉妒是我们在任何领域追求卓越的必然结果。卓越不是，也确实不可能，独立于其他人如何做。相反，它本质上是比较的。在我们寻求它的过程中，我们会“斜眼”（159）看别人，看看他们过得怎么样。社会比较与卓越有着千丝万缕的联系。很少有人相信卓越是一种恶习，普罗塔西关于嫉妒并不总是坏事的论点具有巨大的影响力。每当我们旨在提高自己和磨练我们的技能时，嫉妒就会随之而来。但是她关于嫉妒实际上可能是好的这一更强烈的主张又如何呢？毕竟，如果我们在自我完善的过程中忍不住嫉妒（有时），这很容易让人接受，这不能怪我们。将嫉妒视为一种美德可能更难。在深入探讨这个问题之前，让我们先看看 Protasi 是如何定义嫉妒的。据她介绍，“对于与嫉妒者的认同感相关的商品，嫉妒是对劣势相对于其他人的自卑感的厌恶反应。嫉妒的不愉快促使嫉妒者对他们的处境采取行动”（29）。顺便说一句，嫉妒与嫉妒不同，尽管这两个词在美式英语中经常混淆。Protasi 说，嫉妒想要它没有的东西，但嫉妒在面临失去的威胁时想要保护它所拥有的。Protasi 认为，因为嫉妒有两个变量，所以我们有四种不同的嫉妒。在这里，她将自己与早期的哲学家区分开来，后者最多设定了三种不同的类型。她说，这两个变量是焦点和控制。嫉妒的焦点——也就是我们最关注的东西——可能是被嫉妒的对象或情况，或我们羡慕的人。另一个变量是控制，或者更准确地说，感知控制。这是指一个人对自己获得他人所拥有的好处的能力的评估。将专注和控制的两个极点结合起来，给了我们四种不同的嫉妒可能性。首先，我们有惰性嫉妒，关注的是好的，但好的却被认为是无法获得的。竞争性嫉妒的相似之处在于关注的焦点仍然是善，而不是拥有善的人，但就嫉妒者认为自己有能力获得善而言，它是不同的。相反，当注意力集中在拥有优点的人身上时，当嫉妒者认为优点无法获得时，我们会产生恶意嫉妒，而当它被认为是可以获得时，我们会产生攻击性嫉妒。每种嫉妒都有其自身的行为倾向或动机，以及看待嫉妒对方的方式。行动倾向与我们如何整体评估情绪特别相关。惰性嫉妒导致生闷气，好胜嫉妒导致自我提升（或试图以任何方式自我提升），恶意嫉妒导致破坏他人利益的愿望；好斗的嫉妒激发了偷窃的动机 (43)。这样看来，好胜的嫉妒似乎并没有那么糟糕。这似乎对嫉妒者本人和被嫉妒者都没有坏处。Protasi 的结论是，这既不审慎也不道德。惰性嫉妒对被嫉妒者来说并不是坏事，但对嫉妒者来说似乎确实是坏事。毕竟，这是一种痛苦的情绪，而且这种情绪很容易被伴随这种不讨人喜欢的比较而来的自我厌恶和绝望所加剧。一个人真的不应该感到惰性的嫉妒，纯粹出于一己私利的原因。由于不需要详细说明的原因，侵略性和恶意嫉妒在道德上都是有问题的，因为它们对大多数人来说应该是显而易见的。但是，与大多数认为所有形式的嫉妒在审慎（和道德）上都是有害的嫉妒的早期作家（其中许多人在本书的大附录中提到）相反，Protasi 承认嫉妒的痛苦通常会得到缓解这些案件是希望从竞争对手那里夺取利益或破坏他们的利益。这导致她提出，尽管侵略性嫉妒在道德上显然是坏事，但在审慎上显然不是坏事。当然，通过任何可利用的阴暗手段获得他人的利益后，一个人可能会感到随之而来的羞耻或内疚，但是这些感觉很快就会被拥有自己想要的好东西的满足感所克服。这可能不是我们愿意相信的，但在心理上似乎是现实的。正如许多社会心理学家所表明的那样，我们习惯于自我奉承的评价和虚构。通过侵略性手段获得他人好处的人通常会很容易说服自己，他应该首先拥有这些好处。一开始，人们可能想知道为什么 Protasi 不对恶意嫉妒给予同样审慎的地位，她声称恶意嫉妒在道德上和审慎上都是不好的。毕竟，为了对方而破坏对方的好处可能会让一个人感到满足，不再在她的尊重中处于劣势。然而，Protasi 似乎认为这种满足感可能是短暂的。它还伴随着自身的危险，例如疏远令人羡慕和恐惧的旁观者，从而可能导致社会排斥和孤立。人们可能会想到伊阿古，一个恶毒的嫉妒者，他走到了一个棘手的结局。那么嫉妒又怎么可能是美德呢？因为这是“对重要商品相对缺乏的唯一道德和审慎适当的回应”（90）。这并不意味着嫉妒是容易的。恰恰相反。只有好胜的嫉妒才算数，而且只有当它合适并以正确的方式采取行动时。这里和本书其他地方一样，有亚里士多德的影子。适合竞争性嫉妒的人一定是正确的，因为被嫉妒的人处于自己的比较阶层并且处于优势地位。被羡慕的对象或境遇一定是好的，而且必须有理由认为自己可以升级——也就是说，为自己获得好处——当然，这只有在不止一个人可以拥有的情况下才有可能。Protasi 坚持认为，尽管存在这些困难，但许多人确实设法实现了美德嫉妒。作为一个例子，她以 Lenu 和 Lila 为例，她认为他们嫉妒好胜。Protasi 以令人钦佩的清晰度和对细节的关注来论证她对嫉妒的看法。与许多几乎完全依赖论证、轶事和思想例子的哲学情感著作相比，普罗塔西巧妙地使用实证文献来帮助阐明她的观点。她不止一次以经验为由拒绝了一项提议。同时，她展示了对哲学文献的广泛了解。我非常喜欢读这本书；这对于已经成为一门日益专业化的学科的哲学来说通常是罕见的，使阅读技术含量高且乏味。当然，普罗塔西自己也可能有点迂腐。然而，总的来说，我认为她在仔细推理、关注正在进行的辩论和可能的反对意见以及引人入胜的写作和生动的例子之间找到了令人钦佩的平衡。普罗塔西的人性是这本书的亮点之一。这不是道德主义的摇摆，而是对人类奋斗的复杂性、人类卓越以及对钦佩和尊重无处不在的渴望的富有同情心的审视。这一点在她关于爱和嫉妒的激烈争论的章节中看得更清楚。她争辩说，嫉妒并不总是爱的敌人，尽管是圣保罗。在恋爱关系中，嫉妒是可能的，甚至是不可避免的。当然，不是长期的嫉妒，