Contemporary public discourse is saturated with speech that vilifies and incites hatred or violence against vulnerable groups. The term “hate speech” has emerged in legal circles and in ordinary language to refer to these communicative acts. But legal theorists and philosophers disagree over how to define this term. This paper makes the case for, and subsequently develops, the first corpus-based analysis of the ordinary meaning of “hate speech.” We begin by demonstrating that key interpretive and moral disputes surrounding hate speech laws—in particular, surrounding their compatibility with the rule of law, democracy, and free speech—depend crucially on the ordinary meaning of “hate speech.” Next, we argue, drawing on recent developments in legal philosophy, that corpus linguistics constitutes a distinctively promising tool for ascertaining the ordinary meaning of “hate speech.” Finally, we offer a proof of concept, by outlining, and analyzing the interpretive and moral implications of, the first such study.

当代公共话语充斥着诋毁和煽动针对弱势群体的仇恨或暴力的言论。“仇恨言论”一词出现在法律界和普通语言中，指代这些交流行为。但法律理论家和哲学家对如何定义这个术语存在分歧。本文提出并随后发展了对“仇恨言论”的普通含义的第一个基于语料库的分析。我们首先证明围绕仇恨言论法的关键解释和道德争议——特别是围绕它们与法治、民主和言论自由的兼容性——关键取决于“仇恨言论”的普通含义。接下来，我们认为，借鉴法律哲学的最新发展，语料库语言学构成了一种非常有前途的工具，可以确定“仇恨言论”的普通含义。最后，我们通过概述和分析第一项此类研究的解释和道德含义来提供概念证明。