What degree of justification should be required of epistemological cognition, the kind of cognition by which epistemological problems are to be solved? I consider the question by examining Husserl’s view of the matter. Challenging the current consensus, I argue that he is committed to the infallibility of epistemological cognition. I first present what he takes to be the leading problem of epistemology, which he designates as the ‘problem of transcendence’ or the problem of how ‘transcendent cognition’ is possible. I then give an account of what I call his Non-Transcendence Constraint, on which the problem cannot be solved by means of cognitions of the kind whose possibility it concerns, and so cannot be solved by means of transcendent cognition. Pointing out that he provides four specifications of the problem, I go on to argue that on the most fundamental of these it concerns the general possibility of fallible cognition. By the Non-Transcendence Constraint, however, this entails that the problem of transcendence cannot be solved by means of fallible cognition. I conclude that central aspects of Husserl’s metaepistemology commit him to the infallibility of epistemological cognition, at least as far as solving the supposedly leading problem of epistemology is concerned.

中文翻译：

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胡塞尔的认识论认识

认识论认知需要何种程度的正当化，认识论问题要通过什么样的认知来解决？我通过考察胡塞尔对此事的看法来思考这个问题。挑战当前的共识，我认为他致力于认识论认知的绝对可靠。我首先介绍他认为是认识论的主要问题，他将其称为“超越问题”或“超越认知”如何可能的问题。然后我对我称之为非超越约束的东西进行说明，在这个约束上，问题不能通过其可能性所涉及的那种认知来解决，因此也不能通过超越认知来解决。指出他提供了问题的四个规范，我继续论证，在其中最基本的方面，它涉及易错认知的一般可能性。然而，根据非超越性约束，这意味着超越性问题不能通过易错认知来解决。我的结论是，胡塞尔的元认识论的核心方面使他致力于认识论认知的绝对可靠，至少就解决假定的认识论主要问题而言是这样。