Exploiting Ultimatum Power When Responders Are Better Informed − Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Conflict Resolution,Journal of Conflict Resolution

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Exploiting Ultimatum Power When Responders Are Better Informed − Theoretical and Experimental Analysis of Conflict Resolution
Journal of Conflict Resolution ( IF 2.2 ) Pub Date : 2023-04-11 , DOI: 10.1177/00220027231167846
Werner Güth ₁ , Francesca Marazzi ₂ , Luca Panaccione ₃

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In dyadic ultimatum bargaining proposers, who are privately informed about the pie size, can exploit their “moral wiggle room” by engaging in unfairness which is unobservable by responders. Our set...

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