This paper is about two requirements on wish reports whose interaction motivates a novel semantics for these ascriptions. The first requirement concerns the ambiguities that arise when determiner phrases, such as definite descriptions, interact with ‘wish’. More specifically, several theorists have recently argued that attitude ascriptions featuring counterfactual attitude verbs license interpretations on which the determiner phrase is interpreted relative to the subject’s beliefs. The second requirement involves the fact that desire reports in general require decision-theoretic notions for their analysis. The current study is motivated by the fact that no existing account captures both of these aspects of wishing. I develop a semantics for wish reports that makes available belief-relative readings but also allows decision-theoretic notions to play a role in shaping the truth conditions of these ascriptions. The general idea is that we can analyze wishing in terms of a two-dimensional notion of expected utility.

中文翻译：

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愿望、决策理论和二维内容

本文是关于愿望报告的两个要求，它们的相互作用激发了这些归因的新语义。第一个要求涉及当限定词短语（例如明确的描述）与“wish”相互作用时出现的歧义。更具体地说，几位理论家最近认为，以反事实态度动词为特征的态度归因许可解释，在这些解释上，限定词短语是相对于主体的信念来解释的。第二个要求涉及这样一个事实，即欲望报告通常需要决策理论概念来进行分析。目前的研究是基于这样一个事实，即没有现有的账户同时捕捉到愿望的这两个方面。我为愿望报告开发了一种语义学，它可以提供与信念相关的阅读，但也允许决策理论概念在塑造这些归因的真实条件方面发挥作用。一般的想法是，我们可以根据预期效用的二维概念来分析愿望。