Are Latin American presidents at greater risk for removal in remittance-dependent countries? Departing from the debate about whether remittances produce democratic or autocratic outcomes, this article asks whether remittances contribute to presidential removals, which are an important characteristic of Latin American democracies since the Third Wave. It uses questions about supporting a military coup under high corruption and crime scenarios to gauge remittance recipients’ support for early removal of a president. It finds that remittances create a constituency that tolerates military coups. Using data from Martínez (2021), the analysis also shows that remittances increase the risk of removal for presidents who face a greater number of scandals; but remittances do not pose this threat under poor economic performance.

拉丁美洲总统在依赖汇款的国家面临更大的罢免风险吗？本文与关于汇款是否会产生民主结果或专制结果的争论不同，本文提出了汇款是否会导致总统免职的问题，而这是自第三次浪潮以来拉丁美洲民主国家的一个重要特征。它利用有关在腐败和犯罪率很高的情况下支持军事政变的问题来衡量汇款收款人对提前罢免总统的支持程度。研究发现，汇款创造了一个容忍军事政变的选民。利用马丁内斯（Martínez，2021）的数据，分析还表明，对于面临更多丑闻的总统来说，汇款会增加被罢黜的风险；但在经济表现不佳的情况下，汇款不会构成这种威胁。