ABSTRACT

Family-owned businesses differ in their strategic intent and behavior as they serve as a reservoir of wealth and social status for their family owners. Family-owned businesses demonstrate relatively conservative strategic decision making that aspires long-term wealth preservation and enhancement. For family owners, investments in information technology (IT) raise a predicament as they are risky, yet a long-term imperative. We propose three hypotheses that build upon the thesis that family owners combine a deep understanding of the business with a strong influence on stakeholders within and beyond the firm’s boundaries to exert strategic control in the extended enterprise. First, family ownership negatively influences IT investment, because family owners are likely to avoid investments in IT that are frivolous, reduce information asymmetry, or leave auditable digital trails. Second, the negative influence of family ownership on IT investment is weakened when a career professional is appointed in the senior-most executive position of a family-owned business. This is because professional executives strive to utilize IT for control and performance benefits, and family owners desire to use IT to monitor and control the non-family professional executive. Third, family ownership weakens the negative influence of environmental hostility on the relationship between IT investment and firm performance, as family-owned businesses incur less dynamic adjustment costs and maintain better alignment between IT and business strategy. Empirical analysis, consisting of panel regression estimations, on archival data of publicly listed Indian firms in the years 2006 to 2018 provides support for our theory that highlights how IT for control acts as a noneconomic motivation for the strategic IT behavior of firms. In doing so, we bring family ownership into the theoretical foreground for future IS scholarship. We contribute to theory and practice by advancing the nature of ownership and executive management as sources of heterogeneity in IT investment and its business value.

摘要

家族企业的战略意图和行为各不相同，因为它们是家族所有者的财富和社会地位的储存库。家族企业表现出相对保守的战略决策，渴望长期的财富保值和增值。对于家族企业主而言，信息技术 (IT) 的投资带来了困境，因为它们具有风险，但却是一项长期的当务之急。我们提出三个假设，这些假设建立在家族所有者将对企业的深刻理解与对企业边界内外的利益相关者的强大影响相结合以在扩展企业中施加战略控制这一论点的基础上。首先，家族所有权对 IT 投资有负面影响，因为家族所有者可能会避免轻率的 IT 投资，减少信息不对称，或留下可审计的数字踪迹。其次，当职业专业人员被任命为家族企业的最高管理职位时，家族所有权对 IT 投资的负面影响会减弱。这是因为职业高管努力利用 IT 来控制和提高绩效，而家族所有者希望使用 IT 来监督和控制非家族专业高管。第三，家族所有制削弱了环境敌意对 IT 投资与公司绩效之间关系的负面影响，因为家族企业的动态调整成本较低，并且 IT 与业务战略之间保持更好的一致性。实证分析，包括面板回归估计，对 2006 年至 2018 年印度上市公司档案数据的研究为我们的理论提供了支持，该理论强调控制 IT 如何作为公司战略 IT 行为的非经济动机。通过这样做，我们将家庭所有权带入了未来 IS 奖学金的理论前景。我们通过推进所有权和执行管理的性质作为 IT 投资及其业务价值的异质性来源，为理论和实践做出贡献。