I identify two versions of the scientific anti-realist’s selectionist explanation for the success of science: Bas van Fraassen’s original and K. Brad Wray’s newer interpretation. In Wray’s version, psycho-social factors internal to the scientific community – viz. scientists’ interests, goals, and preferences – explain the theory-selection practices that explain theory-success. I argue that, if Wray’s version were correct, then science should resemble art. In art, the artwork-selection practices that explain artwork-success appear faddish. They are prone to radical change over time. Theory-selection practices that explain theory-success in science are however not faddish. They are mostly stable; that is, long-lived and consistent over time. This is because scientists (explicitly or implicitly) subscribe to what I will call the testability norm: scientific theories must make falsifiable claims about the external physical world. The testability norm and not psycho-sociology explains the theory-selection practices that explain theory-success in science. Contra Wray, scientific anti-realists can then maintain that the external physical world (as expressed in the testability norm) explains theory-success.

我确定了科学反现实主义者对科学成功的选择主义解释的两个版本：Bas van Fraassen 的原版和 K. Brad Wray 的新解释。在 Wray 的版本中，科学界内部的心理社会因素——即科学家的兴趣、目标和偏好——解释了解释理论成功的理论选择实践。我认为，如果雷的版本是正确的，那么科学应该类似于艺术。在艺术中，解释艺术品成功的艺术品选择做法似乎很时髦。随着时间的推移，他们很容易发生根本性的变化。然而，解释科学理论成功的理论选择实践并不流行。他们大多是稳定的;也就是说，长期存在且随时间变化一致。这是因为科学家（明确或暗示地）赞同我所说的可测试性规范：科学理论必须对外部物理世界做出可证伪的主张。可测试性规范而不是心理社会学解释了解释科学理论成功的理论选择实践。相反，科学上的反现实主义者可以坚持认为外部物理世界（如可测试性规范所表达的）解释了理论成功。