What are the truth conditions of want ascriptions? According to an influential approach, they are intimately connected to the agent’s beliefs: ⌜S wants p⌝ is true iff, within S’s belief set, S prefers the p worlds to the not-p worlds. This approach faces a well-known problem, however: it makes the wrong predictions for what we call (counter)factual want ascriptions, wherein the agent either believes p or believes not-p—for example, ‘I want it to rain tomorrow and that is exactly what is going to happen’ or ‘I want this weekend to last forever, but of course it will end in a few hours’. We solve this problem. The truth conditions for want ascriptions are, we propose, connected to the agent’s conditional beliefs. We substantiate this connection by pursuing a striking parallel between (counter)factual and non-(counter)factual want ascriptions on the one hand and counterfactual and indicative conditionals on the other.

中文翻译：

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（反）事实想要归因和有条件的信念

需求归属的真实条件是什么？根据一种有影响力的方法，它们与代理人的信念密切相关：⌜S 想要 p⌝ 为真当且仅当，在 S 的信念集中，S 更喜欢 p 世界而不是非 p 世界。然而，这种方法面临着一个众所周知的问题：它对我们所谓的（反）事实需求归因做出了错误的预测，在这种归因中，代理要么相信 p，要么不相信 p——例如，“我希望明天下雨，然后这正是将要发生的事情”或“我希望这个周末永远持续下去，但当然它会在几个小时后结束”。我们解决这个问题。我们认为，想要归因的真实条件与代理人的条件信念有关。