Do electoral incentives affect immigration policies? Exploiting the Italian system for refugees’ reception and data from Italian municipalities, we show that proximity to elections reduces the probability that a municipality applies to host a refugee center by 26%, despite the economic benefits arising from these centers. Low electoral competition and high shares of extreme-right voters drive the effect. Our results are rationalized by a theoretical model and can explain the unequal distribution of refugees across and within countries.

中文翻译：

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不再受欢迎：选举激励措施对接收难民的影响

选举激励措施会影响移民政策吗？利用意大利的难民接收系统和来自意大利市政当局的数据，我们表明，尽管这些中心带来了经济利益，但临近选举会使市政当局申请接纳难民中心的可能性降低了 26%。低选举竞争和极右翼选民的高比例推动了这种效果。我们的结果通过理论模型合理化，可以解释难民在国家之间和国家内部的不平等分布。