Replicability is widely regarded as one of the defining features of science and its pursuit is one of the main postulates of meta-research, a discipline emerging in response to the replicability crisis. At the same time, replicability is typically treated with caution by philosophers of science. In this paper, we reassess the value of replicability from an epistemic perspective. We defend the orthodox view, according to which replications are always epistemically useful, against the more prudent view that claims that it is useful in very limited circumstances. Additionally, we argue that we can learn more about the original experiment and the limits of the discovered effect from replications at different levels. We hold that replicability is a crucial feature of experimental results and scientists should continue to strive to secure it.

可复制性被广泛认为是科学的决定性特征之一，其追求是元研究的主要假设之一，元研究是为应对可复制性危机而出现的学科。同时，科学哲学家通常对可复制性持谨慎态度。在本文中，我们从认识论的角度重新评估了可复制性的价值。我们捍卫正统的观点，根据该观点，复制在认识论上总是有用的，而更谨慎的观点则声称它在非常有限的情况下是有用的。此外，我们认为我们可以从不同级别的复制中更多地了解原始实验和发现效应的局限性。我们认为，可复制性是实验结果的一个关键特征，科学家们应该继续努力确保它。