Replicability is widely regarded as one of the defining features of science and its pursuit is one of the main postulates of meta-research, a discipline emerging in response to the replicability crisis. At the same time, replicability is typically treated with caution by philosophers of science. In this paper, we reassess the value of replicability from an epistemic perspective. We defend the orthodox view, according to which replications are always epistemically useful, against the more prudent view that claims that it is useful in very limited circumstances. Additionally, we argue that we can learn more about the original experiment and the limits of the discovered effect from replications at different levels. We hold that replicability is a crucial feature of experimental results and scientists should continue to strive to secure it.

可复制性被广泛认为是科学的定义特征之一，其追求是元研究的主要假设之一，元研究是一门为应对可复制性危机而出现的学科。与此同时，科学哲学家通常谨慎对待可复制性。在本文中，我们从认知的角度重新评估可复制性的价值。我们捍卫正统观点，即复制在认识论上总是有用的，反对更谨慎的观点，即声称复制在非常有限的情况下有用。此外，我们认为我们可以更多地了解原始实验以及通过不同级别的复制所发现的效果的局限性。我们认为，可重复性是实验结果的一个重要特征，科学家应该继续努力确保它。