This research explores a classic predicament of authoritarian leaders—the need for a strong security force to deter opposition alongside a fear of the threats that a strong force could pose. By providing a unique view into the security services in The Gambia under President Jammeh (1994–2017), it argues that fostering uncertainty was the key tool in maintaining control of the armed forces. It situates this approach in the context of wider theories of institutional arbitrariness. The research demonstrates how unpredictability was operationalized through multiple, overlapping practices targeting both the structural level and routine aspects of military life. It also looks at international opportunities as an avenue to mitigate some of the negative effects of pervasive uncertainty in the forces. The research provides new insights into the internal dynamics of state security forces by drawing on data newly available after The Gambia’s democratic political transition of 2017. This includes interviews with members of the forces, testimonies from the Truth, Reconciliation, and Reparation Commission (TRRC), court martial transcripts, and other government reports.

中文翻译：

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不可预测性在维持对冈比亚安全部队的控制中的作用

这项研究探讨了威权领导人的典型困境——需要强大的安全力量来威慑反对派，同时又担心强大的力量可能带来的威胁。通过对贾梅总统（1994-2017 年）领导下的冈比亚安全部门提供独特的视角，它认为培养不确定性是维持对武装部队控制的关键工具。它将这种方法置于更广泛的制度任意性理论的背景下。该研究表明，不可预测性是如何通过针对军事生活的结构层面和常规方面的多重重叠实践来实施的。它还将国际机会视为减轻部队普遍存在的不确定性的一些负面影响的途径。