We test the assumption that bidders in farmland auctions have private valuations, a necessary condition for auction efficiency. We apply the test of Haile et al. (2003) to farmland auctions in Eastern Germany covering the price boom 2007–2020. To disentangle valuations from observed and unobserved heterogeneity, we develop a new approach relying on professional appraisals of the land. Based on our rich identification strategy, validation and robustness checks, we reject pure private valuations. We conclude that the presence of a common value in bidders’ valuations is very likely resulting in potentially inefficient land privatisation auctions and a winner’s curse.

中文翻译：

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农田拍卖是否存在赢家诅咒的风险？

我们检验农田拍卖中的投标人有私人估价的假设，这是拍卖效率的必要条件。我们应用 Haile 等人的测试。(2003) 到德国东部的农田拍卖，涵盖 2007 年至 2020 年的价格上涨。为了将估值与观察到的和未观察到的异质性区分开来，我们开发了一种依赖土地专业评估的新方法。基于我们丰富的识别策略、验证和稳健性检查，我们拒绝纯粹的私人估值。我们的结论是，投标人估值中存在共同价值很可能导致土地私有化拍卖可能效率低下和赢家诅咒。