This article presents a conceptual framework for analyzing the strength of ceasefires in intra-state conflict. The framework is based on the perspectives of ceasefire practitioners. The practitioners view the essence of ceasefire design as the reduction and management of risk, which ranges in severity from violations to complete breakdown of the ceasefire agreement. The framework identifies three determinants of ceasefire risk: the design's objective quality, being the extent to which the ceasefire arrangements reduce and manage risk; the design's subjective quality, being the parties’ satisfaction with these arrangements; and the will of the parties to end the conflict through negotiations. Each dimension is negatively associated with risk, such that strong objective quality, strong subjective quality, and strong political will reduce the level of risk. We explore the effects of these dimensions and the relationship between them. We discuss two exceptions to the standard thesis that objectively strong design leads to subjectively strong design and ceasefire durability: “spurious agreements,” which are signed by the parties under duress with no intention of honoring them, and preliminary ceasefires, which the parties generally prefer to be objectively weak. We illustrate the conceptual framework through case studies of ceasefires in Sudan and South Sudan.

中文翻译：

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降低和管理风险：国内冲突中强有力停火的维度

本文提出了一个概念框架，用于分析国内冲突中停火的强度。该框架基于停火实践者的观点。从业者将停火设计的本质视为风险的减少和管理，其严重程度从违反停火协议到完全破坏停火协议不等。该框架确定了停火风险的三个决定因素：设计的客观质量，即停火安排降低和管理风险的程度；设计的主观质量，即各方对这些安排的满意度；以及各方通过谈判结束冲突的意愿。每个维度都与风险负相关，客观质量强，主观质量强，强大的政治意愿降低了风险水平。我们探讨了这些维度的影响以及它们之间的关系。我们讨论了标准论点的两个例外情况，即客观上强大的设计会导致主观上强大的设计和停火持久性：“虚假协议”，由各方在胁迫下签署，无意遵守它们，以及初步停火，各方通常更喜欢客观上是弱者。我们通过苏丹和南苏丹停火的案例研究来说明概念框架。”，这是双方在胁迫下签署的，无意兑现，以及初步停火，双方通常更愿意在客观上软弱。我们通过苏丹和南苏丹停火的案例研究来说明概念框架。”，这是双方在胁迫下签署的，无意兑现，以及初步停火，双方通常更愿意在客观上软弱。我们通过苏丹和南苏丹停火的案例研究来说明概念框架。