A distinguishing feature of the modern state is the broad scope of social welfare provision. This remarkable expansion of public assistance was characterized by huge spatial and temporal disparities. What explains the uneven expansion in the reach of social welfare? We argue that social welfare expansion depends in part on the ability of the governed to compel the state to provide rewards in return for military service—and crucially, that marginalized groups faced greater barriers to obtaining those rewards. In colonial states, subjects faced a bargaining disadvantage relative to citizens living in the colony and were less likely to win concessions from the state for their wartime sacrifices. We test this argument using a difference-in-differences research design and a rich data set of local spending before and after World War I in colonial Algeria. Our results reveal that social welfare spending expanded less in communes where the French subject share of the population was greater. This paper contributes to the state-building literature by highlighting the differential ability of the governed to bargain with the state in the aftermath of conflict.

现代国家的一个显着特征是提供广泛的社会福利。公共援助的显着扩张以巨大的空间和时间差异为特征。什么解释了社会福利范围的不均衡扩张？我们认为，社会福利的扩大部分取决于被治理者是否有能力迫使国家提供奖励以换取服兵役——而且至关重要的是，边缘化群体在获得这些奖励方面面临更大的障碍。在殖民地国家，相对于生活在殖民地的公民，臣民面临讨价还价的劣势，并且不太可能因战时牺牲而从国家那里获得让步。我们使用差异研究设计和第一次世界大战前后殖民地阿尔及利亚当地支出的丰富数据集来检验这一论点。我们的结果表明，在法国人占人口比例较大的公社中，社会福利支出的增长较少。本文通过强调被统治者在冲突后与国家讨价还价的不同能力，为国家建设文献做出了贡献。