This article examines the Royal Navy (rn) in the aftermath of the Falklands War of 1982, focussing on the long-standing disparity between commitments and resources in UK defence planning. Two central arguments are developed. First, it is argued that the 1981 defence review failed to address the disparity between UK commitments with resources. Second, despite victory in the Falklands War, the UK naval lobby failed to reverse the long-term decline in the size of the rn although, in the long-term, the 1982 war reinforced the case for enhancing rn maritime aviation capabilities. This article presents a case of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the rn seeking, and failing, to resolve an insoluble problem. This analysis of UK naval policy demonstrates that British defence planning remains torn between a maritime strategy and a continental commitment to the present day.

中文翻译：

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“先取得胜利，然后充分利用它”：马岛战争后的皇家海军

本文考察了英国皇家海军 (rn) 在 1982 年福克兰群岛战争之后，重点关注英国国防规划中承诺与资源之间长期存在的差距。提出了两个中心论点。首先，有人认为 1981 年的国防审查未能解决英国承诺与资源之间的差异。其次，尽管马岛战争取得胜利，但英国海军游说团体未能扭转英国海军规模长期下降的局面。rn尽管从长远来看，1982 年的战争加强了加强rn海上航空能力。本文介绍了国防部 (MoD) 和rn寻求并未能解决无法解决的问题。对英国海军政策的分析表明，英国的国防规划至今仍处于海上战略和大陆承诺之间。