What is the nature of conscious sensory experience? In The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience David Papineau sets out to answer this question. He argues for the qualitative view: conscious sensory experiences are “intrinsic qualitative properties of people that are only contingently representational” (6).This book is instructive, engaging, original, full of argument, straight-talking, and it defends an interesting view! I enthusiastically recommend it to philosophers of mind and perception.Papineau’s central argument is a last view standing argument: wading through the detritus left after his assault on competitor views—naive realism and representationalism—one finds the qualitative view, standing strong. It is “the only option that makes good metaphysical sense” (8). Given this, I focus my critical attention in what follows on Papineau’s main negative arguments. First, a brief overview.The book has an introduction and four chapters. In chapter 1, Papineau argues against naive realism and begins a detailed critical investigation of representationalism. Papineau’s discussion of contingent and essential representationalism is particularly important, for it helps him to clarify his own disagreement with representationalism (30–32). Papineau thinks that conscious sensory properties can represent, but they need not. He accepts contingent representationalism but rejects essential representationalism—the mainstream position in the philosophy of perception. Consider words written on a page. In themselves these marks aren’t representationally significant. “Their representational power derives from the way they happen to be used by linguistic communities. But just those marks could easily have not been used in this way” (32). Papineau views conscious sensory properties as similar: such properties need not represent at all; they are representational only in the context of contingent external circumstances.Chapter 2 is where Papineau argues against essential representationalism. This chapter is a real highlight—a deep, original, and rewarding critical discussion. Papineau considers and rejects various ideas that might be used to motivate representationalism (e.g., the argument from the transparency of experience). He also helpfully weaves together themes that we don’t always find treated together in discussions of representationalism in the philosophy of perception. For instance, how general theories of representation interact with representationalism.In chapter 3, Papineau clarifies and develops his positive view. Like the previous chapters, this is jam-packed with interesting discussion. I’ll mention just two things. First, positioning. Papineau positions his view by aligning it with adverbialism (though not adverbialism about our ways of talking about sensory experience [83–84]). He also usefully compares his view to qualia views: these views typically hold that some sensory conscious properties conform to something like the qualitative model, but that these are additional to essentially representational properties. In contrast, Papineau denies that any conscious sensory properties are essentially representational (87).Second, Papineau attempts to explain why the structure and organization of experience can lead one to believe that experience is inherently directed on external items. For instance, elements of experience alter as I move around the external world—just what one would expect if those elements were inherently directed on stable items out there (compare afterimages, which, as it were, move with me). But none of this, Papineau suggests, means that these elements of experience really are inherently directed on external items. Here Papineau acknowledges that there is an “intuitive pull” to the idea that experiences somehow involve external items (91). Naive realists and representationalists explain this intuitive pull by claiming that experiences inherently relate one to or represent such external items. They will thus be motivated to question whether Papineau’s alternative explanation is adequate. Is this intuitive pull really intelligible if conscious sensory properties are purely qualitative, as Papineau suggests? I expect this aspect of the chapter to generate some critical discussion.Finally, in chapter 4 Papineau develops an account of introspection of sensory experiences, discusses how Jackson’s many properties problem for adverbialism (and related problems) don’t apply to his view, discusses the link between the qualitative view and the phenomenal concepts strategy against the knowledge argument, and develops new ideas about rich or high-level experience—among other things! This final chapter explores implications of the qualitative view and makes connections within and outside of the philosophy of perception.What then of Papineau’s negative arguments? (Note that Papineau develops various arguments against his key opponents. Here I have space to focus just on the main ones.) Let’s start with naive realism. Papineau’s main objection is the following.Papineau seems to be arguing that the naive realist commits to a radical disconnect between consciousness and introspection—pushing our very concept of consciousness to breaking point. This, he suggests, is a consequence of their commitment to conscious differences between veridical perceptions and matching hallucinations. The target here is naive realist disjunctivism, which holds that the conscious character of a veridical perception of a yellow ball (say) is constituted by acquaintance with aspects of the external world, whereas the conscious character of a subjectively matching hallucination is different—it has a very different nature.Papineau understands conscious character, standardly enough, in terms of what it is like for a subject to undergo an experience (16). We can understand, then, why it would be puzzling to claim that aspects of conscious character could be in principle introspectively undetectable. No doubt there is a lot more to say, but let’s grant that there cannot be aspects of what it is like for a subject to undergo a sensory experience that are in principle introspectively undetectable.The question, then, is whether committing to conscious differences between veridical perceptions and matching hallucinations as above entails that there are aspects of conscious character which are in principle introspectively undetectable? I will now argue, applying some ideas from French and Gomes 2019, section 6, that this is doubtful.Call one’s veridical perception of the yellow ball V, and one’s matching hallucination H. Now let’s invoke a relational model of the conscious difference between these experiences: it consists in the relation of being nonidentical that holds between the conscious characters of V and H. Now, suppose that we grant that this difference is introspectively undetectable. This just means that one cannot know, purely on the basis of introspection, that V and H have nonidentical conscious characters.However, this does not entail a radical disconnect between consciousness and introspection: it does not entail that there is any aspect of what it is like for one to undergo V, or H, that is not in principle available to introspection. For the relation of nonidentity between the characters of V and H is not an aspect of what it is like for one to undergo either H or V. Even if the best-placed introspector is unable to detect that the characters of V and H are nonidentical, they can still introspectively reflect on the character of V and on the character of H.Suppose instead that we invoke a difference maker model of the conscious difference between V and H. Consider here Dretske’s (2004: 9–10) discussion of change blindness. Your clean-shaven friend grows a mustache. The mustache makes for a difference between your friend at one time and your friend later. Similarly, the conscious character of V constitutively involves acquaintance with a mind-independent yellow ball-shaped object. This makes for a difference between V and H. And it is an aspect of what it is like for one to undergo V.But is the conscious difference between V and H, understood in this way, introspectively undetectable? No! Just as you might see a difference maker in seeing your friend’s mustache even if you fail to notice that they have changed, one might introspect an aspect of conscious character that makes two experiences consciously different, even if one cannot tell by introspection that these experiences are different.So, the naive realist can agree with Papineau that we had better not radically disconnect sensory consciousness from introspection. But they can question whether the conscious differences that they admit between veridical and hallucinatory experiences really do amount to such a disconnect.Consider, then, representationalism. Papineau’s main argument here is that conscious sensory properties and representational properties are incommensurable. Now, Papineau understands representationalists to be committed to the idea that when we sensorily represent a yellow ball this involves a mental relation to abstract, uninstantiated yellowness—for how else could a representationalist plausibly understand sensory representation of a yellow ball in a case of hallucination where no yellowness is instantiated? He thus argues as follows. (1) Instantiations of conscious sensory properties constitute concrete facts with causes and effects.(2) Instantiations of representational properties constitute abstract facts that cannot feature as causes or effects.Therefore,(3) Conscious sensory properties are not representational properties.Papineau defines concrete facts as “constituted by some spatio-temporal particular (or particulars) instantiating some first-order property (or relation).... They are localized in space and time and have causes and effects” (66–67). With this, and assuming that epiphenomenalism is implausible, (1) looks secure. But what about (2)? Papineau says thatNow, it might be that my sensorily representing a yellow ball is a matter of me, a spatiotemporal particular, instantiating a first-order property or relation—that of being mentally related to (abstract) yellowness. But that is not enough to make this fact a concrete fact unless it is in the causal nexus and spatiotemporally local (“here-and-now”). Indeed, Papineau claims that this fact (call it FACT) is an abstract fact, not a concrete fact. The question is whether Papineau has done enough to establish this.My worry is that the main point that Papineau seems to offer for the claim that FACT is abstract is that it involves abstract yellowness. But why should the claim that FACT involves something abstract make FACT itself abstract? Does it make it nonlocal? This is not obvious, since despite involving abstract yellowness, FACT is still a matter of a spatiotemporal subject existing here-and-now instantiating a property here-and-now. Similarly, consider the position of FACT in the causal nexus. It seems perfectly intelligible that certain causes in the subject’s environment and brain conjoin to produce an experience that is constitutively a relation between them and abstract yellowness. Similarly, it seems perfectly intelligible that FACT might cause that subject to behave in certain ways (e.g., to say, “Ah, yellowness, how I love thee”). Or, at least, it is not clear why Papineau would find such causal claims problematic. They do not involve, after all, the claim that the mental relation in question is itself a causal relation—which would be problematic on the assumption that uninstantiated yellowness is abstract. Only that the experience, constituted by some sort of relation between a concrete subject and an abstract property, is in the causal nexus.These critical remarks about Papineau’s central arguments are clearly not decisive, but merely invitations for further discussion of the very interesting lines of thought that Papineau explores in this excellent book.Thanks to Anil Gomes for discussion.

中文翻译：

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感官体验的形而上学

有意识的感官体验的本质是什么？在感官体验的形而上学中，David Papineau 着手回答这个问题。他主张定性观点：有意识的感官体验是“人的内在定性属性，只是偶然地具有代表性”(6)。这本书具有启发性、引人入胜、原创、充满论据、直截了当，它捍卫了一个有趣的观点！我热情地向心灵哲学家和知觉哲学家推荐它。帕皮诺的中心论点是最后一个观点常设论点：在他攻击竞争对手的观点——朴素现实主义和表征主义——之后，涉过留下的碎屑，人们发现了定性观点，站得住脚。它是“具有良好形而上学意义的唯一选择”（8）。鉴于这种，我将批评的注意力集中在帕皮诺的主要否定论点上。一、简要概述。全书有绪论和四章。在第 1 章中，帕皮诺反对朴素现实主义，并开始对表现主义进行详细的批判性调查。帕皮诺对偶然的和本质的表征主义的讨论尤为重要，因为这有助于他澄清自己对表征主义的分歧 (30-32)。Papineau 认为有意识的感官属性可以代表，但它们不需要。他接受偶然的表征主义，但拒绝本质表征主义——感知哲学中的主流立场。考虑写在页面上的单词。这些标记本身并不具有代表性。“它们的表现力源于它们恰好被语言社区使用的方式。但只是那些标记很容易没有以这种方式使用”（32）。Papineau 认为有意识的感觉属性是相似的：这些属性根本不需要表现；它们仅在偶然的外部环境的背景下具有代表性。第 2 章是 Papineau 反对本质表征主义的地方。本章是真正的亮点——深入、原创且有益的批判性讨论。Papineau 考虑并拒绝了可能被用来激发表征主义的各种想法（例如，来自经验透明性的论点）。他还很有帮助地将我们在感知哲学中的表征主义讨论中并不总是一起处理的主题编织在一起。例如，一般的表征理论如何与表征主义相互作用。在第 3 章中，帕皮诺阐明并发展了他的积极观点。与前几章一样，本章充满了有趣的讨论。我只提两件事。第一，定位。Papineau 通过将其与副词对齐来定位他的观点（尽管不是关于我们谈论感官体验的方式的副词 [83-84]）。他还将自己的观点与感受性观点进行了有益的比较：这些观点通常认为，某些感官意识属性符合定性模型之类的东西，但这些是对本质上的表征属性的补充。相比之下，Papineau 否认任何有意识的感觉特性本质上是表征性的 (87)。其次，帕皮诺试图解释为什么经验的结构和组织会让人相信经验本质上是针对外部项目的。例如，当我在外部世界四处移动时，体验的元素会发生变化——如果这些元素本质上指向稳定的物体，人们就会期望发生这种情况（比较残像，它可以说是和我一起移动）。但是，Papineau 认为，这一切都不意味着这些体验元素实际上是内在地针对外部项目的。在这里，Papineau 承认体验以某种方式涉及外部项目的想法存在“直觉拉动” (91)。朴素的现实主义者和表象主义者通过声称体验本质上与此类外部项目相关或代表此类外部项目来解释这种直觉拉动。因此，他们将有动力质疑帕皮诺的替代解释是否充分。如果像 Papineau 所建议的那样，有意识的感官特性纯粹是定性的，那么这种直觉的拉动真的是可以理解的吗？我希望本章的这一方面能引起一些批判性讨论。最后，在第 4 章中，Papineau 发展了对感官体验的内省，讨论了杰克逊的状语（及相关问题）的许多属性问题如何不适用于他的观点，讨论定性观点和现象概念策略之间的联系反对知识论证，并发展关于丰富或高级经验的新想法 - 除其他外！最后一章探讨了定性观点的含义，并在感知哲学内外建立了联系。那么帕皮诺的否定论点是什么？（请注意，帕皮诺针对他的主要对手提出了各种论点。这里我有篇幅只关注主要论点。）让我们从天真的现实主义开始。帕皮诺的主要反对意见如下。帕皮诺似乎在争辩说，天真的现实主义者致力于在意识和内省之间彻底脱节——将我们的意识概念推向崩溃的边缘。他认为，这是他们致力于真实感知和匹配幻觉之间有意识差异的结果。这里的目标是朴素的现实主义析取主义，它认为对黄球（比如说）的真实感知的意识特征是由对外部世界各个方面的了解构成的，而主观上匹配的幻觉的意识特征是不同的——它具有非常不同的性质。Papineau 非常标准地理解意识特征，即主体经历某种体验的感觉 (16)。那么，我们就可以理解，为什么声称有意识性格的各个方面在原则上是内省无法检测到的会令人费解。毫无疑问，还有很多话要说，但让我们承认，原则上内省无法察觉的主体经历感官体验的某些方面是不可能的。如上所述的真实知觉和匹配的幻觉意味着有意识性格的某些方面原则上是内省无法察觉的？我现在要争辩说，应用 French and Gomes 2019，第 6 节的一些想法，这是值得怀疑的。将一个人对黄球的真实感知称为 V，将一个人的幻觉称为 H。现在让我们调用这些体验之间有意识差异的关系模型：它包含在V 和 H 的有意识特征之间存在的不同关系。现在，假设我们承认这种差异是内省无法检测到的。这仅仅意味着一个人不能仅仅基于内省而知道 V 和 H 具有不同的意识特征。然而，这并不意味着意识和内省之间存在根本的分离：它并不意味着存在它的任何方面就像一个人经历 V 或 H，这在原则上是不可用于内省的。因为 V 和 H 的性格之间的非同一性关系不是一个人经历 H 或 V 的一个方面。即使最有资格的内省者也无法发现 V 和 H 的性格不同，他们仍然可以内省地反思 V 的特征和 H 的特征。假设我们调用 V 和 H 之间有意识差异的差异制造者模型。这里考虑 Dretske（2004：9-10）对变化失明的讨论. 你的胡子刮得很干净的朋友长了胡子。小胡子让你曾经的朋友和后来的朋友大不相同。类似地，V 的意识特征构成性地涉及认识一个独立于心智的黄色球形物体。这使得 V 和 H 之间存在差异。它是一个人经历 V 的一个方面。但是，以这种方式理解的 V 和 H 之间的有意识差异是否内省无法察觉？不！正如即使你没有注意到朋友的胡子发生了变化，你可能会在看到朋友的胡子时看到一个差异制造者一样，一个人可能会反省有意识的性格的一个方面，它使两种体验有意识地不同，即使一个人不能通过反省来判断这些体验是不同。因此，天真的现实主义者可以同意帕皮诺的观点，即我们最好不要从根本上将感官意识与内省分开。但他们可以质疑，他们承认的真实体验和幻觉体验之间的有意识差异是否真的构成了这种脱节。那么请考虑一下表征主义。帕皮诺在这里的主要论点是有意识的感觉属性和表征属性是不可比较的。现在，Papineau 理解表征主义者致力于这样的想法，即当我们用感官代表一个黄色的球时，这涉及到与抽象的、未具体化的黄色的心理关系——因为在幻觉的情况下，表征主义者怎么可能合理地理解黄色球的感官表征没有黄色被实例化？他因此论证如下。(1) 有意识的感觉属性的实例化构成了具有因果关系的具体事实。(2) 表征属性的实例化构成了不能作为原因或结果的抽象事实。因此，(3) 有意识的感官属性不是表征属性。帕皮诺将具体事实定义为“由一些时空特殊性（或特殊性）构成，实例化了一些一阶属性（或关系）……它们局限于空间和时间，并具有因果关系”（66-67）。有了这个，并假设副现象论是不可信的，（1）看起来是安全的。但是（2）呢？Papineau 说，现在，我在感官上代表一个黄色的球可能是我的问题，一个时空的特殊性，实例化一阶属性或关系——与（抽象的）黄色在心理上相关的属性或关系。但这不足以使这个事实成为一个具体的事实，除非它处于因果联系和时空局部（“此时此地”）。事实上，Papineau 声称这个事实（称之为 FACT）是一个抽象的事实，而不是一个具体的事实。问题是帕皮诺是否已经做了足够的工作来证明这一点。我担心的是，帕皮诺似乎为 FACT 是抽象的说法提供的主要观点是它涉及抽象的黄色。但是，为什么声称 FACT 涉及抽象的东西会使 FACT 本身变得抽象呢？它会使它成为非本地的吗？这并不明显，因为尽管涉及抽象的黄色，但 FACT 仍然是时空主体的问题，此时此地存在并实例化此时此地的属性。同样，考虑 FACT 在因果关系中的位置。似乎完全可以理解的是，受试者环境和大脑中的某些原因联合起来产生了一种体验，这种体验本质上是它们与抽象黄色之间的一种关系。相似地，似乎完全可以理解 FACT 可能导致受试者以某些方式行事（例如，说，“啊，黄色，我多么爱你”）。或者，至少，不清楚为什么帕皮诺会发现这样的因果断言是有问题的。毕竟，它们不涉及所讨论的心理关系本身就是因果关系的主张——假设未实例化的黄色是抽象的，这将是有问题的。只有由具体主体和抽象属性之间的某种关系构成的经验处于因果关系中。这些对帕皮诺中心论点的批评显然不是决定性的，而只是邀请进一步讨论非常有趣的线条认为 Papineau 在这本优秀的书中进行了探索。感谢 Anil Gomes 的讨论。我多么爱你”）。或者，至少，不清楚为什么帕皮诺会发现这样的因果断言是有问题的。毕竟，它们不涉及所讨论的心理关系本身就是因果关系的主张——假设未实例化的黄色是抽象的，这将是有问题的。只有由具体主体和抽象属性之间的某种关系构成的经验处于因果关系中。这些对帕皮诺中心论点的批评显然不是决定性的，而只是邀请进一步讨论非常有趣的线条认为 Papineau 在这本优秀的书中进行了探索。感谢 Anil Gomes 的讨论。我多么爱你”）。或者，至少，不清楚为什么帕皮诺会发现这样的因果断言是有问题的。毕竟，它们不涉及所讨论的心理关系本身就是因果关系的主张——假设未实例化的黄色是抽象的，这将是有问题的。只有由具体主体和抽象属性之间的某种关系构成的经验处于因果关系中。这些对帕皮诺中心论点的批评显然不是决定性的，而只是邀请进一步讨论非常有趣的线条认为 Papineau 在这本优秀的书中进行了探索。感谢 Anil Gomes 的讨论。所讨论的心理关系本身就是因果关系的说法——假设未实例化的黄色是抽象的，这将是有问题的。只有由具体主体和抽象属性之间的某种关系构成的经验处于因果关系中。这些对帕皮诺中心论点的批评显然不是决定性的，而只是邀请进一步讨论非常有趣的线条认为 Papineau 在这本优秀的书中进行了探索。感谢 Anil Gomes 的讨论。所讨论的心理关系本身就是因果关系的说法——假设未实例化的黄色是抽象的，这将是有问题的。只有由具体主体和抽象属性之间的某种关系构成的经验处于因果关系中。这些对帕皮诺中心论点的批评显然不是决定性的，而只是邀请进一步讨论非常有趣的线条认为 Papineau 在这本优秀的书中进行了探索。感谢 Anil Gomes 的讨论。