The Supreme Court has deemed the right to exclude one of the most fundamental property rights. Accordingly, the Court has offered the right to exclude heightened protection under the Takings Clause. However, the Court has left significant uncertainty about the scope of the right to exclude that is protected under takings doctrine. For instance, does the Takings Clause require compensation if the government, pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response and Liability Act (CERCLA), requires a landowner to house another party’s pollutants? 

This Comment draws from property theory and analytical jurisprudence to offer a new approach to takings analyses concerning the right to exclude. First, it argues that the right to exclude is strictly a Hohfeldian claim-right, or a legal position created by imposing a duty not to invade on someone else. An important implication of this definition for takings challenges to environmental regulation is that the property right to exclude is strictly a right against persons but not against animals or pollution. Second, this Comment addresses what it means for the right to exclude to be enforceable. It argues that government action that renders the right to exclude unenforceable should count as a taking. However, the right to exclude can be enforceable through a variety of means, so the right could remain enforceable absent a particular means of enforcement. Applying this framework to CERCLA, this Comment concludes that CERCLA does not abrogate landowners’ right to exclude.

最高法院认为排除权是最基本的财产权之一。因此，法院提供了排除征用条款下加强保护的权利。然而，法院对根据征用原则保护的排除权的范围留下了很大的不确定性。例如，如果政府根据《综合环境响应和责任法》(CERCLA) 要求土地所有者安置另一方的污染物，征用条款是否需要赔偿？ 

本评论借鉴了财产理论和分析法学，为排除权的征收分析提供了一种新方法。首先，它认为排除权严格来说是一种霍菲尔德式的索赔权，或者是通过强加不侵犯他人的义务而产生的法律地位。这个定义对环境监管提出挑战的一个重要含义是，排除财产权严格来说是一种针对人的权利，而不是针对动物或污染的权利。其次，本评论阐述了排除权可执行的含义。它认为，使排除权无法执行的政府行为应算作征收。但是，排除权可以通过多种方式强制执行，因此，如果没有特定的执行方式，该权利仍可执行。将此框架应用于 CERCLA，此评论得出结论认为 CERCLA 并未废除土地所有者的排除权。